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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FORREST WHITTLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION and NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. Because this is an appeal from the district court 
involving a conviction of a first degree felony, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Were any alleged errors in the grand jury proceedings against defendant 
cured by the petit jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? 
Case No. 970112 
Priority No. 2 
If this Court agrees that defendant's subsequent conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt mooted his challenge to the indictment, no standard of review applies since the 
Court will not be required to review any decision of the district court. 
If this Court reaches the merits of defendant's claim, it must determine the standard 
of review, inasmuch as no Utah court has never articulated the standard applicable to 
such claims. However, it might follow the lead of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, which reviews a trial court's order granting or denying a motion 
to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 
971 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 1988)), 
cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 331 (1996). 
2. Did defendant's conviction improperly result from a series of erroneous 
evidentiary rulings? 
With some exceptions, the issue of whether evidence is admissible is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness, incorporating a "clearly erroneous" standard of review 
for subsidiary factual determinations. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 
P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). An erroneous decision to admit or exclude 
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is harmful. An error is harmful 
if it is reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. (citations 
omitted). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13(5) (1995): 
(a) The grand jury shall receive evidence without regard for the formal 
rules of evidence, except the grand jury may receive hearsay evidence only 
under the same provisions and limitations that apply to preliminary hearings. 
(b) Any person, including a witness who has previously testified or 
produced books, records, documents, or other evidence, may present 
exculpatory evidence to the attorney representing the state or the special 
prosecutor and request that it be presented to the grand jury, or request to 
appear personally before the grand jury to testify or present evidence to that 
body. The attorney for the state or the special prosecutor shall forward the 
request to the grand jury. 
(c) When the attorney for the state or the special prosecutor is personally 
aware of substantial and competent evidence negating the guilt of a subject 
or target that might reasonably be expected to lead the grand jury not to indict, 
he shall present or otherwise disclose the evidence to the grand jury before 
the grand jury is asked to indict that person. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was indicted on 16 March 1995 on a charge of murder, a first degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (R. 1-2, addendum A).1 Defendant 
moved to dismiss the indictment (R. 18, 25-52). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
250-51, 262-63). Defendant's motion for interlocutory review was denied (R. 347). 
1
 The indictment charges defendant with "Murder, a First Degree Felony"; it cites UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 without specifying the version of the section relied upon (R. 1). At 
the time of the crime, this crime was actually known as "murder in the second degree." See 
amendment notes, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1995). The elements of the crime charged 
are identical in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1985) (in effect at the time of the 
crime), in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1995) (in effect at the time of the indictment) and 
in the jury instructions (R. 494). 
3 
After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder (R. 401, 406, 
412, 513, 510). Defendant was sentenced to statutory fines and sentences, plus restitution 
in the amount of funeral costs and counseling (R. 570). Defendant filed a motion for 
new trial, which was denied (R. 571-73, 595-97,653-54). Defendant timely appealed 
(R. 658). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The party. 11 May 1986 was Mother's Day (R. 1120, 1320, 1403). On that day, 
Mike Staples and defendant, Staples' former foster brother, went over to Tim Robinson's 
basement apartment (R. 1120-21, 1129, 1321, 1379). They arrived in the early afternoon 
and began to drink beer and smoke marijuana (R. 1121-22). Robinson lived with Tina 
Schroyer and her two kids at the comer of Eighth East and Bryan Avenue in Salt Lake 
City (R. 1318-19, 1377). Defendant, Staples, Robinson, and Schroyer "hung out, partied, 
[and] dr[a]nk" (R. 1125, 1323). 
Defendant had a blue .38 caliber revolver (R. 1122-23, 1321-22, 1380). During 
the afternoon he pulled it out and tried to trade it to Robinson for marijuana, but Robinson 
did not have enough marijuana for the trade (R. 1124, 1322-23, 1379, 1381). Schroyer 
said, "Put that gun away," because of the children (R. 1124-25, 1381). 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
4 
The victim. In 1986, Lisa Strong was 25 years old (R. 1038). She worked as 
an artist, as a model, and at an answering service (R. 1039). She did not have a car, 
but used public transportation or walked (R. 1044). 
The first encounter. That day at about 2:00 p.m., Lisa Strong walked past the 
house on Eighth East, heading southbound wearing headphones (R. 1382). Defendant 
tried to get her attention but she was oblivious to him due to her headphones (R. 1383). 
Defendant became belligerent and started swearing at her, but she just kept walking 
(R. 1383). According to Tina Schroyer, defendant "got mad. He was jumping around 
and calling her a cunt and saying that stuff about how all women are the same and he 
can't stand them and he was really mad" (R. 1383). 
The killing. At about midnight, Staples, Robinson, and defendant were outside 
watching Robinson's pit bull climb a tree (R. 1128, 1390). At about that time, Staples 
went in the house to get another beer (R. 1127). In the house, he heard defendant's voice 
outside but could not make out what he was saying (R. 1128-29; see also 1028). Walking 
up the stairs from the apartment he heard five or six gunshots (R. 1129). As Staples 
was leaving, he came around a comer and saw defendant standing on the street lowering 
a handgun (R. 1129). Staples was scared and left (R. 1131). 
Robinson had also gone into the house, where he heard the shots (R. 1326). He 
woke Schroyer and asked her if she had heard the shots (R. 1327, 1390). She did not 
(R. 1391). However, they both heard several dogs going "crazy" (R. 1328, 1390). Through 
5 
the window, Robinson saw someone running by the house (R. 1328). Schroyer saw that 
it was defendant; she recognized him by his army jacket (R. 1391-92). Schroyer went 
back to bed (R. 1393). 
A neighbor, Norman Sharpies, heard the shots, walked outside and saw and heard 
Lisa Strong breathe her final breath (R. 996-98). 
In a few minutes Robinson heard sirens, so he went back outside, where a neighbor 
told him that someone had been shot (R. 1328-30). The police arrived and quite a few 
people gathered, among them Robinson (R. 1014-15, 1033). He walked down to the 
Kensington corner to see if he knew the victim, but the police were taping off the area 
and would not let him get close to the victim (R. 1330). Robinson offered to assist the 
police in locating the killer (R. 1330). He '\vanted the yards around [his] house especially 
checked," but the police were unhelpful (R. 1330-31). 
At around sunrise, Detective George Clegg noticed Tim Robinson sitting nearby 
(R. 1098). They spoke briefly at that time, and Robinson later called Detective Clegg 
at the station and left the message that he wished to speak with him (R. 1099). Clegg 
or another officer called him back (R. 1099). 
Within a block of her home, Lisa Strong was shot with a .38 revolver in the right 
temple (R. 1051, 1053, 1063-64, 1077, 1113-15). The bullet entered "from back to front 
6 
slightly," and "slightly downward at a ten-degree angle" (R. 1057-58).3 The position 
of Lisa's head and body at the time she was shot is unknown, though she might have 
been running and ducking (R. 1159-62, 1109). She died within minutes (R. 1057). 
Defendant's confessions to friends. The next day defendant went over to Staples' 
house and told him, "Whatever you saw that night, it didn't happen" (R. 1133). 
About three days after the shooting, defendant went back over to Robinson's house 
(R. 1394, 1434). Defendant came in to get a beer and watched Schroyer working in 
the kitchen for a minute (R. 1394). Then he said, "I'm the one that killed that girl" (R. 
1395). When Schroyer asked which girl, defendant said, "the Strong girl, the Lisa Strong 
girl on the comer" (R. 1395). Schroyer asked him why he did it (R. 1395). Defendant 
"said because he had just gotten a gun and he wanted to see if it worked" (R. 1395). 
"And he thought that it was funny because she didn't even hear what was going on, she 
was wearing headphones" (R. 1395). In fact, Schroyer testified, defendant "thought the 
whole thing was funny that he did it and that he got away with it" (R. 1429).4 Later 
3
 Two investigators testified that a "string test" from two recovered bullets suggested that 
shots were fired from 32 to 36 inches off the ground (R. 1527-28, 1589-90). However, the 
bullet "which really zeroed one of the strings" was not the one that actually struck Lisa 
Strong (R. 1538). 
Several defense witnesses testified that they heard or saw a car drive away after the 
shooting (R. 1502, 1505-06, 1510). Another investigating officer testified that the shooter 
might have been in a car or might have been on foot (R. 1589-90). 
4
 Defendant also told Schroyer he thought it was funny that the police thought a car was 
involved with the shooting (R. 1429). 
7 
defendant called Schroyer and in a disguised voice "said he was going to come downstairs 
and do me like he did Lisa Strong" (R. 1396, 1483). 
A week to two weeks later, defendant bragged to Robinson that "he killed the bitch 
on the corner" (R. 1332, 1340). At the time, Robinson dismissed the comment as "a 
brag"(R. 1333, 1340).5 
Later Robinson mentioned to Staples that someone had been shot that night, and 
that's when Staples "put two and two together" (R. 1133-34). Staples did not go to the 
police because of defendant's threatening statement to him, because he was scared, because 
he knew of no reason why defendant would have shot anyone that night, and because 
he did not actually see anyone shot (R. 1134-35).6 Later, as Staples and his then-girlfriend 
were driving near the intersection of Eighth East and Kensington, he told her that defendant 
had shot a girl there (R. 1136, 1304). 
That summer, defendant was at a Salt Lake City body shop with Douglas Bateman 
and other friends and said, "I capped a bitch downtown" (R. 1211-12). Bateman recounted 
5
 While incarcerated in Pennsylvania, Robinson was interviewed by two Salt Lake police 
officers (R. 1333,1341-42). Although they pressured Robinson to say that he saw defendant 
pull the trigger, Robinson said that he did not see it, but would testify that he did (R. 1346, 
1350,1370). He told them he "didn't actually see the shooting" (R. 1371). The officers did 
not help Robinson to get out of jail (R. 1372-73). 
6
 On cross-examination, Staples admitting having given various inconsistent accounts 
under oath to police and to an attorney, including the story that he was not present at all that 
night (R. 1137-75). On redirect, Staples testified that he denied any knowledge of the crime 
because police "tried to accuse me of the murder, threatened my life and my family" (R. 
1179; see also R. 1138,1156,1163-64,1182-83). He also feared defendant (R. 1165,1183). 
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this comment to his wife that night (R. 1213-14, 1221). Terence Robison also heard 
the comment (R. 1228-29). And in December 1994, defendant told Derald Ross that 
he had been partying and drinking and doing drugs and used a .38 caliber pistol to kill 
a woman here in Utah (R. 1278-79). He said he "wasn't too concerned about the gun 
because the police would never find it" (R. 1279). 
Defendant's statement to police. In 1991, police contacted defendant (R. 1292-93). 
Defendant at first denied knowing Tim Robinson; he also claimed to have no knowledge 
of the Lisa Strong murder (R. 1293-94, 1450). Immediately after the indictment in 1995, 
police again spoke with defendant (State's ex. 27). He admitted going to Tim Robinson's 
house to party on a "warm" day in 1986 (id). He claimed that Robinson displayed a 
gun and that around midnight, while Robinson (with the gun), Staples, and defendant 
were out on the lawn, defendant turned his head and heard one shot fired (id.). When 
he looked around, defendant claimed, the gun was pointing from the northeast corner 
to the northwest comer of Bryan Avenue and Eighth East (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. a. Defendant's attack on the grand jury proceeding fails as a matter of law 
because a petit jury later found him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
rule in Utah is clear that any errors in a preliminary hearing are cured by subsequent 
conviction. This Court should join a majority of states and federal circuits by extending 
this rule to grand jury indictments. 
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b. The Tenth Circuit is in the minority. However, its standard for reversal is high—in 
practice it is insurmountable—and defendant does not meet it: he has failed to demonstrate 
fundamental unfairness undermining the grand jury's ability to exercise independent 
judgment. 
The prosecutor's incidental references to other shooting committed with the same 
gun that killed Lisa Strong did not significantly infringe on the grand jury's ability to 
exercise independent judgment. The grand jurors understood that the prosecutor was 
not accusing defendant of these crimes, which were mentioned only in response to a 
juror's question about the length of the proceedings. The references were more in the 
nature of full disclosure of the nature of the investigation than an attempt to bias the 
grand jury. 
References to defendant's other crimes did not render the entire grand jury proceeding 
unfair or significantly infringe on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment. 
This is shown, inter alia, by defendant's subsequent conviction by a petit jury that was 
unaware of them. 
Comments by the prosecutor and prosecution witnesses about Mike Staples' various 
inconsistent stories—made in response to skeptical grand jury questions—are more 
apologetic than manipulative. In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged that his case had 
problems requiring an eventual petit jury to weigh credibility. 
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The prosecutor did not withhold substantial and competent evidence negating 
defendant's guilt that might reasonably be expected to lead the grand jury not to indict 
as defendant claims. The evidence in question was impeachment evidence that did not 
prevent the petit jury from convicting defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The prosecutor did not render the entire grand jury proceeding unfair or significantly 
infringe on the grand juiy's ability to exercise independent judgment by introducing hearsay. 
Precisely what hearsay is permitted before a grand jury in Utah is less than clear. However, 
it is freely admissible in federal grand jury proceedings. Accordingly, its admission cannot 
be said to be fundamentally unfair under the Tenth Circuit's test. 
2. Defendant's conviction did not result from a combination of erroneous evidentiary 
rulings. The rulings defendant attacks were all correct. 
a. The trial court properly excluded defense witness James Sherrard's prior hearsay 
statements because (1) they were not against interest, and (2) they were untrustworthy. 
Defendant's attack on the trial court's permitting Sherrard to assert his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent fails because defense counsel called him precisely so that he would 
do so and hence be found "unavailable" for hearsay purposes. Since this defense tactic 
succeeded, any error worked in the defendant's favor. 
b. The trial court properly admitted Derald Ross's testimony that defendant told 
him he had killed a woman in Utah with a .38 under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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A confession is highly probative. Conversely, the risk of unfair prejudice was low, since 
the testimony did not suggest an inappropriate basis for a verdict of guilty. 
Nor can defendant prevail on his discovery challenge, which alleges that the 
prosecution failed to disclose the significant fact that Ross and defendant had fought 
in prison. This claim fails because a defendant cannot complain about a prosecutor's 
failure to reveal a fact of which the defendant himself has personal knowledge. 
c. Defendant's statement, to several people, that he had "capped a bitch" was not 
ambiguous and was thus properly admitted. Defendant's argument, based exclusively 
on State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995), was not preserved. Moreover, 
Troyer is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. Unlike defendant here, Troyer had 
committed two different assaults to which his incriminating statement might have applied; 
admitting it would have forced upon him the Hobson's choice of acknowledging his 
prior crime or allowing the jury to read the statement as referring to the charged crime. 
Because defendant faced no similar dilemma, Troyer is inapposite here. 
James Bell's testimony that police had relied on Schroyer's testimony in a previous 
case was properly admitted to impeach his testimony that she was an unreliable informant. 
Defense counsel were not deficient for not objecting to admission of Tina Schroyer's 
identification of defendant on hearsay grounds. A prior statement by a witness identifying 
a person is not hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Accordingly, any objection 
would not have been well taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY CLAIMED ERRORS IN THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS 
AGAINST DEFENDANT WERE CURED BY THE PETIT JURY'S 
VERDICT OF GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
Defendant claims that he is entitled to reversal of his conviction because the 
prosecutor's alleged "flagrant" misconduct during the grand jury proceeding violated 
defendant's right to fundamental fairness and "significantly infringed on the grand jury's 
ability to exercise independent judgment." Br. Aplt. at 28 (capitalization omitted).7 
Trial court's ruling. After the indictment was returned, defendant moved the 
trial court to dismiss the indictment and to require that he be charged by Information 
7
 Although defendant cites to both "the Due Process Clause of the U. S. Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution," the issue is not separately briefed. See Br. 
Aplt. at 28, 34. This Court has "encouraged parties briefing state constitutional issues to use 
historical and textual evidence, sister state law, and policy arguments in the form of 
economic and sociological materials to assist us in arriving at a proper interpretation of the 
provision in question." Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870P.2d916,921 n.6(Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). "Each of these types of evidence can help in divining the intent 
and purpose of the framers, a critical aspect of any constitutional interpretation." Id. 
(citations omitted). Defendant's brief attempts no such analysis. 
This Court will "decline to undertake a state constitutional analysis" of an appellant's 
claim where he does not separately brief the state constitutional claim and "'does not argue 
that the analysis of this issue under the Utah Constitution would be different from its analysis 
under the federal constitution This Court will not engage in constructing arguments out 
of whole cloth....'" State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v. 
Lajferty, 749 P.2d 1239,1247 & n. 5 (Utah 1988), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 
Laffertyv. Cook, 949F.2d 1546 (1 Oth Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 504U.S.911 (1992); Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 n. 2 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994)). 
Accordingly, no state constitutional claim is before this Court. 
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and be granted a preliminary hearing (R. 25).8 The trial court denied the motion and 
ruled that, while some of the prosecutor's and the witnesses' statements to the grand 
jury may arguably have been inappropriate, the alleged misconduct "did not substantially 
influence the Grand Jury in its decision to indict the defendant" (R. 263). The court 
continued, "There was substantial evidence upon which the grand jury could indict the 
defendant. The Grand Jury's judgment was not significantly infringed by the prosecutor's 
conduct in this case" (R. 263). 
Defendant petitioned this Court for interlocutory review, which was denied (R. 
347). Defendant proceeded to trial and was, of course, convicted (R. 510). 
A. Any error in the grand jury proceeding was cured by the petit 
jury's verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In seeking interlocutory review, defendant argued that such review was necessary 
in part because "if this Court refuses to hear Whittle's appeal now and he is convicted 
at trial, he might lose the right to appeal the fairness of the indictment process forever." 
Petition for Permission to Appeal at 9.9 In support of this argument, defendant cited 
8
 There is authority suggesting that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain this 
motion. See State v. Giles, 576 P.2d 876 (Utah 1978) (per Ellett, C.J., with one justice 
concurring and three justices concurring in result) (quoting with approval the statement that 
"the trial court should not inquire into the adequacy and competency of the evidence before 
the grand jury"). 
9
 This document is not in the District Court's file, but it is in the Supreme Court's file. 
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State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991) and State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 566 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1992). Id.10 
Defendant's argument is correct: defendant's subsequent conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a petit jury mooted his challenge to the grand jury proceeding. 
Utah. Under the Utah Constitution, criminal offenses may be prosecuted either 
by information or by indictment. Utah Const, art. I sec. 13. That a subsequent conviction 
moots any errors in the preliminary hearing is well established. This Court in Humphrey 
held that because a preliminary hearing magistrate is not a court, a magistrate's order 
binding a defendant over to stand trial is not appealable. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. 
The Court noted that if a bindover orders "were in fact orders of a circuit court," then 
the defendant would have a state constitutional right to appeal, which right "would not 
be satisfied if the defendant first had to endure a trial in the district court, because any 
challenges to the bindover order would be mooted by the trial verdict " Id. at 467 n.6 
(emphasis added). 
In Quas, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "the question as to whether the 
information should have been quashed by the district court is moot because any defect 
was cured by defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." Quas, 837 P.2d at 
10
 The State's response does not dispute that a later conviction would moot defendant's 
grand jury claims, but states merely, "Even if true, this does not constitute a compelling 
ground for interlocutory review." Response in Opposition to Petition for Permission to 
Appeal From Interlocutory Order at 7. 
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567. The court relied on the above-quoted passage from Humphrey and on United States 
v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986). Id. at 566-67. See also State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
688, 694 n.3 (Utah App. 1995) (following Quas and Humphrey), cert denied, 913 P.2d 
749 (1996). 
Because an indictment is equivalent in all material respects to a bindover, any defect 
in an indictment must also cured by a defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Other states. A number of states have extended a Humphrey/Quas-type preliminary 
hearing rule to grand jury indictments. See People v. Tyler, 802 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Colo. 
App. 1990); State v. Kilby, 947 P.2d 420, 423-24 (Id. App. 1997); State v. Atwood, 832 
P.2d 593, 618 (Ariz. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1084 (1993); State v. Tempest, 660 
A.2d 278, 280 (R.I. 1995); but see Pease v. Commonwealth, 482 S.E.2d 851, 852 n.l 
(Va. App. 1997) (reversing conviction where prosecutor examined grand jury witness 
in violation of statute prohibiting his presence in the grand jury room). Like Quas, these 
cases rely on United States v. Mechanik. 
U.S. Supreme Court. Mechanik involved a violation of a federal rule: two 
government witnesses appeared simultaneously before a federal grand jury. Mechanik, 
475 U.S. at 67. The Court assumed for purposes of argument that this joint appearance 
violated rule 6(d), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, had there been actual prejudice, 
the district court would have been justified in dismissing the indictment before trial. 
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Id. at 69-70. The Court also acknowledged that the error "had the theoretical potential 
to affect the grand jury's determination whether to indict. . ." Id. at 70. 
However, the Court stated, "the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not 
only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, 
but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured 
by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with 
the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 70.u 
The Court reasoned that "[t]he reversal of a conviction entails substantial social 
costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend 
further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken 
place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences." Id. at 72. Moreover, 
the passage of time may "render retrial difficult, even impossible." Id. (citation omitted). 
"Thus, while reversal 'may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice 
it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
The Court held that the petit jury's guilty verdict "rendered harmless any conceivable 
error in the charging decision that might have flowed from the violation. In such a case, 
the societal costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too substantial to justify 
11
 In a footnote, the Court recognized Vasquez v. Hillery, A1A U.S. 254 (1986), in which 
it had set aside a conviction because of racial discrimination in the composition of the grand 
jury, a structural error. Id. at 70 n.l. However, it noted that the prophylactic concerns 
expressed in that case "have little force outside the context of racial discrimination in the 
composition of the grand jury." Id. 
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setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand jury proceedings." 
Id. at 73.12 
Federal circuits: majority. Most federal circuit courts of appeals have read Mechanik 
broadly according to its terms, refusing to entertain challenges to grand jury indictments 
after conviction by a petit jury. See, e.g., United States v. Dugan, 150 F.3d 865, 868 
(8th Cir. 1998) (allegation that government misled grand jury rendered harmless by petit 
jury's guilty verdict), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 528 (1998); United States v. Eltayib, 88 
F.3d 157, 173 (2nd Cir.) (subsequent conviction by petit jury remedies prosecutorial 
misconduct in grand jury proceeding), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 619 (1996); United States 
v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 251 (6th Cir. 1996) (alleged presentation of perjured testimony 
to grand jury rendered harmless by subsequent conviction by petit jury); United States 
12
 The federal standard of reversible error in reviewing a grand jury indictment where the 
defendant was not yet been tried is found in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 
250,256 (1988), a case involving non-constitutional error. The Supreme Court stated, "We 
hold, as a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand 
jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants." Id. at 254. In short, the 
principle of harmless error applies to grand jury proceedings just as it does to criminal trials. 
Id. at 255. A "court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply 'in order to 
chastise what the court view[s] as prosecutorial overreaching."9 Id. at 256 (citation omitted, 
bracketed material in original). It then held that "dismissal of the indictment is appropriate 
only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision 
to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial 
influence of such violations." Id. at 256 (quoting Mechanik, 106 S. Ct. at 945-46 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring)). 
Moreover, "the law presumes, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that a grand 
jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority." United States v. "R " Enterprises, Inc., 
498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 75,106 S.Ct. 938, 
944 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 671-72 (3rd Cir. 1993) (alleged prosecutorial misconduct rendered 
harmless by subsequent conviction by petit jury's guilty verdict), cert, denied, 511 U.S. 
1076 (1994), 513 U.S. 812 (1994); People of the Territory of Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 
397, 399 (9th Cir. 1993) (after conviction, claim that prosecutor failed to present exculpatory 
evidence was harmless beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Valencia-Lucena, 
925 F.2d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1991) (conviction by petit jury cured discrepancy in DEA 
agent's testimony at grand jury proceeding). 
Federal circuits: minority. However, three circuits have read Mechanik more 
narrowly to bar postconviction review only of so-called "technical" violations of rule 
6, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but not violations calling into question the 
"fundamental fairness" of the criminal proceedings. See United States v. Kramer, 864 
F.2d 99, 101 (11th Cir. 1988);13 United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154, 159-60 (3rd Cir. 
1988); United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1986). 
Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit contrived this distinction in Taylor, but subsequent 
Tenth Circuit cases have applied it inconsistently or not at all. E.g., compare Taylor, 
798 F.2d at 1340 (failure to present exculpatory evidence was not "technical"), with United 
States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 1996) (failure to correct false 
evidence and commenting on defendant's silence were "technical errors"). 
13
 The Eleventh Circuit has since held that the government's presentation of forged 
documents was harmless and did not so compromise the grand jury proceedings as to render 
them "fundamentally unfair." United States v. Exarhos, 135 F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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In United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 505 U.S. 
1223 (1992) the Tenth Circuit ignored Taylor's technical/fundamental distinction altogether 
and held that defendant's conviction must stand despite a claim that government witnesses 
"presented testimony to the grand jury that was misleading and inaccurate with respect 
to a crucial element of the crimes alleged," since the petit jury's verdict of guilty a fortiori 
established probable cause. Id. at 1212. See also United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 
726-27 (10th Cir. 1987) ("If a petit jury has knowledge of the same misstatement made 
to the grand jury and nonetheless finds a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is unlikely that the error before the grand jury, which must find only probable cause, 
was prejudicial"), cert denied, 482 U.S. 918. 
Indeed, the State is aware of no case, and defendant has cited none, in which the 
Tenth Circuit has reversed a conviction for errors in the grand jury proceeding. This 
Court should therefore be reluctant to reverse defendant's conviction based on the Tenth 
Circuit precedent he cites. 
Rather, this Court should ignore the chimerical fundamental/technical dichotomy 
and follow Edgmon, Mechanik, and a majority of states and federal circuits by extending 
the Humphrey/Quas rule—that subsequent conviction cures defects in the preliminary 
hearing—to grand jury indictments. 
Instant case. The case at bar demonstrates the wisdom of doing so. Defendant 
does not claim the right not to be tried. See Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 803 ("Only 
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a defect so fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a grand jury, or 
the indictment no longer to be an indictment, gives rise to the constitutional right not 
to be tried"); Br. Aplt. at 80. Nor does he claim structural error in the composition of 
the grand jury itself. See Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n.l. He asks only for dismissal of 
the indictment, Br. Aplt. at 55-56, in which event the State could presumably re-prosecute 
him by indictment or information. Yet there can be no doubt that, a petit jury having 
found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he would be indicted again or bound 
over. Consequently, in this case the interests at stake weigh heavily in favor of recognizing 
that "any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 70. 
B. Even under the Tenth Circuit standard he advocates, defendant 
has failed to show fundamental unfairness undermining the grand 
jury's ability to exercise independent judgment 
Assuming arguendo that for some reason the petit jury's verdict of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt did not cure any claimed errors in the grand jury proceeding, defendant 
has nevertheless failed to establish reversible error even under the Tenth Circuit standard. 
Tenth Circuit standard. Under that standard, a reviewing court must first "determine 
whether the claimed errors should be characterized as technical or procedural and affecting 
only the probable cause charging decision by the grand jury, or whether the alleged errors 
should be characterized as threatening the defendant's right to fundamental fairness in 
the criminal process." United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir.1987). 
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Errors "characterized as procedural violations affecting only the probable cause 
charging decision by the grand jury" are mooted by the petit jury's guilty verdict. Id. 
However, errors that "can be charged as threatening the defendant's rights to fundamental 
fairness as going beyond the question of whether the grand jury had sufficient evidence 
upon which to return an indictment, a determination of guilt by a petit jury will not moot 
the issue." Id. (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Second, it must be determined whether the prosecutor engaged in flagrant or 
egregious misconduct which significantly infringed on the grand jury's ability to exercise 
independent judgment." Id. The Tenth Circuit has not defined "fundamental fairness."14 
The standard is high. A "presumption of regularity that attaches to grand jury 
proceedings," and "[dismissal of an indictment returned after deliberation by a grand 
jury is a very drastic action." Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d at 1473 (citation omitted). 
Under Tenth Circuit precedents, presenting misleading and arguably inflammatory 
testimony and commenting on the defendant's silence is usually held to be either technical 
error, see Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d at 1245, or not to significantly infringe on the grand 
jury's ability to exercise independent judgment. See United States v. Washington, 1998 
WL 777072, *3-4 (addendum D). Moreover, using evidence summaries, granting "informal 
14
 Some cases affirm the conviction without walking through this two-step analysis. See 
United States v. Edmonson, 962 F.2d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 505 U.S. 1223 (1992); United 
States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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immunity," systematic violations of rule 6(d) (unauthorized persons present), imposition 
of unauthorized secrecy obligation on two witnesses, referring to government witnesses 
as "agents of the grand jury," and unjustifiable mistreatment of a witness favorable to 
the defense has been held not to threaten the grand jury's independence. Kilpatrick, 
821 F.2d at 1467-75 (reversing dismissal of indictment). 
If, as the State believes, the Tenth Circuit has never employed this two-step test 
to reverse a conviction for error in a grand jury proceeding,15 the test is in practice not 
merely high, but insurmountable. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's departure from the majority 
view of Mechanik is theoretical only. 
Active grand jury. The personality of the particular grand jury is relevant to the 
analysis. If "[t]he grand jury transcripts show an active, independent, and questioning 
grand jury, familiar with the record, one that thoughtfully questioned, rather than submitted 
to statements and suggestions of the Government attorneys," that fact militates against 
a finding that the grand jury's independence was infringed by alleged errors. Kilpatrick 
15
 The State's research did disclose a case in which the Tenth Circuit ruled that an 
indictment must be dismissed, but that case did not involve a subsequent conviction. United 
States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 903-04 (10th Cir. 1990), affirmed the dismissal of an 
indictment on the ground that "the government withheld substantial exculpatory material 
from the grand jury." However, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "requiring the 
prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury's 
historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body." United States 
v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992). 
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821 F.2d at 1467-75. The grand jury here was active, independent, familiar with the 
record, and thoughtfully questioned witnesses and the prosecutor. 
The prosecutor opened the proceeding in a low key way by explaining the process 
briefly to the grand jurors. He explained that "this is really an investigation, and you 
are here to try to decide whether or not we have enough evidence to charge someone" 
(R. 1746: 2). He continued: "Now, I have prepared an indictment in this case, and after 
you have heard from the four witnesses, I can leave the indictment with you, and you 
meet and decide whether or not you want to file charges. You don't have to. That's 
clearly your decision" (R. 1746: 2). 
The prosecutor was candid about weaknesses in his case: "I will be honest with 
you, we don't have the gun . . . It has never been recovered. There is no physical evidence. 
He didn't leave any fingerprints. There is nothing of a physical nature that's recovered 
at the scene of the crime that links him to the shooting" (R. 1746: 7). 
Detective Mike George also disclosed problems with the case. He told the grand 
jury that in the late 1980's police developed a suspect by the name of Paul Ezra Rhoades, 
but that "they could never present sufficient evidence to the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office to warrant a charge on Mr. Rhoades" (R. 1746: 15). He also disclosed that Tim 
Robinson, Tina Schroyer, and Michael Staples were all involved in criminal activity (R. 
1746: 16-18). He also disclosed that Tim Robinson used his testimony as an "ace in 
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the hole," that Mike Staples spoke to police because they scared him, and that later these 
witnesses "began to step back from their testimony, and recan't [sic]" (R. 1746: 19). 
The grand jurors actively participated in the process. They asked detailed and 
relevant questions, such as how many "slugs" were found; where police believed defendant 
was positioned when he fired the shots; whether defendant had run back towards Robinson's 
house (where Staples saw him) after the shooting; what the lighting conditions were; 
why, if Schroyer saw defendant run by after the shooting, she would not have mentioned 
this fact to Robinson; whether the witnesses kept silent out of fear of prosecution for 
their own crimes; whether the witnesses were still involved in criminal activity; what 
follow-up was done on other potential witnesses; the height of the retaining wall in front 
of Robinson's house; whether defendant's black and Hispanic friends were present at 
the time of the shooting and why they were not testifying; and how credible Staples and 
Schroyer were ("You are going to have to judge the credibility on your own") (R. 1746: 
34-43). They also explored apparent inconsistencies in the versions of Staples and Schroyer 
(R. 1746: 37-38). 
During Staples' testimony, a grand juror asked five specific questions designed 
to test Staples' claim that he saw defendant holding a gun (R. 1746: 60-61). Staples 
acknowledged that he at first denied knowing anything about the shooting, that later he 
talked when police "threatened me," and that still later he "recanted" (R. 1746: 67). 
A grand juror also explored with Staples the reasons for these flip-flops (R. 1746: 67-68). 
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During Schroyer's testimony, grand jurors asked about where Robinson was when 
Schroyer heard the shots; about Schroyer's seeing defendant; and about defendant's 
girlfriend, who resided in the house above Robinson and Schroyer (R. 1746: 90-92). 
After Schroyer testified, a grand juror confronted the prosecutor with an inconsistency 
in the testimony: "There is a discrepancy in his clothing. Mike says he was wearing 
brown shorts, and she [Schroyer] says he was wearing Levis" (R. 1746: 92). 
During Detective Chuck Oliver's testimony, grand jurors questioned discrepancies 
between his account of Staples' first statement and Staples' own testimony; asked how 
much of Staples' story was reported without police revealing what they knew; asked 
whether Staples' first interview was recorded; and asked Oliver about intimidating Staples 
by making him feel "kind of coerced with a threat" (R 1746: 98-100). Oliver acknowledged 
that Staples "started changing his story, wa[]vering from I wasn't even there, to I was 
in the house when it happened, to I don't even know what you guys are talking about" 
(R. 1746: 100). A grand juror also asked whether it was possible that Schroyer and 
Staples "have been able to get together and collaborate their stories" (R. 1746: 102). 
1. The prosecutor's reference to related murders did not 
render the grand jury proceeding unfair. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor "threatened defendant's right to fundamental 
fairness by flagrantly utilizing other unrelated murders to induce the grand jury to indict." 
Br. Aplt. at 38 (capitalization and underlining omitted). 
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The prosecutor mentioned the other murders in the course of answering a grand 
juror's question about the scope of the proceeding: 
MR. JONES: . . . Like I say, I think the bottom line is just listen to 
the evidence that we have, and then make a decision on your own. 
GRAND JUROR: If we hand down an indictment today, what would 
we be doing, probably, the other times that we would be returning? 
MR. JONES: It is probably the same thing. What Mr. George will 
explain to you is what we have here is a case involving murder. It took place 
in 1986, May 12, a young girl Lisa Strong is her name. What they have 
discovered in the course of the investigation is that the gun that was used 
to kill Lisa Strong was used to kill some other young women. What we 
think may happen, we are not sure, what may happen, if we charge in 
this case, it may help us solve some of the other cases. 
That's why I don't know whether you will be called back again as 
a grand jury. But there is that possibility. We wanted to be up front with 
you, and explain to you, if we hand down an indictment on this case, 
it may ultimately help us solve or lead to charges on some other people 
in connection with some other murders. So that's why we are — we don't 
know that for sure. I am not trying to get your hopes up one way or the 
other. But that is, indeed, a real possibility here. 
GRAND JUROR: You can't present those other charges in a courtroom 
setting unless he has been actually indicted for those other murders? 
MR. JONES: Yes. That's kind of what we are thinking. The police 
have investigated all of these murders, back in 1985 and 1986. We never 
felt like there was enough evidence to charge anyone on any of the cases. 
But we have reached a point where we think at this point that we have got 
to present the evidence, we have got to make a decision as to whether there 
is enough to go. What we are hoping, the best-case scenario is that we 
will file charges, and that, maybe, by charging in this case, it may help 
us solve those other cases. And if that comes about, then the grand jury 
would be called back to decide whether there is enough evidence to charge 
additional defendants or additional cases. 
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Just — does that answer your question? 
GRAND JUROR: Yes. 
(R. 1746: 3-4, emphasis added). Later in the proceedings, a prosecution investigator 
testified: 
I was asked to meet with some witnesses who had met with an attorney that 
had been hired by the families of these victims, that there was an opportunity 
that, perhaps, we could put enough information together so that we could 
obtain an indictment in this case, particularly the Lisa Strong case, and also 
continue to investigate the other homicides, to see if there is a potential that 
anyone else in those — involved in those homicides would be indicted. 
(R. 1746: 8-9). The investigator described the four homicide victims (R. 1746: 10). 
The prosecutor did not imply '"that Whittle may have been a serial killer who stalked 
young women." Br. Aplt. at 40. Rather, he emphasized that he had "absolutely no evidence, 
other than the fact that the same weapon was used," that defendant committed the other 
killings (R. 1746: 126). 
These incidental references to other crimes did not significantly infringe on the 
grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment. The grand jurors understood that 
the prosecutor was not accusing defendant of these crimes, which were mentioned only 
in response to a juror's question about the length of the proceedings. The references 
were more in the nature of full disclosure of the nature of the investigation than an attempt 
to bias the grand jury. 
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Moreover, the fact that the prosecutor "specifically instructed the grand jury that 
its role was limited to a consideration of the [charged] case," mitigates any prejudice 
created by his reference to unrelated crimes. United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 
1032 (1st Cir. 1988). 
2. The prosecutor's reference to defendant's prior crimes did 
not render the grand jury proceeding unfair. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor engaged in flagrant misconduct by referring 
to defendant's prior record and misconduct. See Br. Aplt. at 43. He cites references 
to burglaries,16 aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual assault, and "pistol whipping a 
young black man . . . and taking money from him" (R. 1746: 40), and prison difficulties. 
Br. Aplt. at 42-43. The "most egregious" example of such testimony, according to 
defendant, is Mike Stales' testimony that defendant kicked his pregnant foster sister in 
the stomach and "made her fall down the stairs" (R. 1746: 46). 
Defendant acknowledges that the Utah Rules of Evidence (other than those relating 
to privileges) do not apply in grand jury proceedings. See Br. Aplt. at 41; Utah R. Evid. 
16
 Witness Mike George referred to both home and car burglaries (R. 1746: 17-18). 
Defendant objects that "[a] review of Whittle's arrest record shows no arrests or convictions 
for burglarizing homes." Br. Aplt. at 42. However, defendant cites no record support for 
this factual allegation, which must consequently be disregarded on appeal. An appellate 
court's "review is of course limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal." 
Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985). "[Appellate 
courts of this state do not consider new evidence on appeal." Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 
P.2d 843,847 (Utah App. 1994) (declining to take judicial notice of date that postal zip codes 
were introduced to the public) (citing Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512,513 (Utah 1990). 
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1101(b)(2). He claims rather that presentation of this evidence violated his due process 
rights. See Br. Aplt. at 41. 
Evidence of prior misconduct is frequently held to have made no difference to 
the outcome of grand jury proceeding and thus harmless. See Pitts v. Superior Court, 
876 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Ariz. 1994); Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 698 N.E.2d 896, 907-08 
(Mass.), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 523 (1998); State v. Scherzer, 694 A.2d 196, 227 (N.J. 
App.), certification denied, 700 A.2d 878 (1997); People v. Skinner, 632 N.Y.S.2d 283, 
284-85 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995), appeal denied, 666 N.E.2d 1073 (1996). 
Here the references were not prejudicial. Information suggesting that grand jury 
targets committed unrelated crimes, even where it "served no purpose except to predispose 
the grand jury against them," is not prejudicial where "the grand jury had credible and 
relevant evidence that was virtually conclusive of guilt/' United States v. Al Mudarris, 
695 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983). Likewise, a statement 
by a prosecutor that the grand jury targets are "connected with organized crime and could 
harm" a key government witness, though improper, have been held not to be prejudicial. 
United States v. Riccobene, 451 F.2d 586, 587 (3rd Cir. 1971). 
A defendant's subsequent conviction also establishes lack of prejudice. For a 
defendant "to show that he has been unfairly or actually prejudiced, he must show that 
the indictment was returned due to the grand jury's assumption [or knowledge] that [he] 
had a prior criminal record." United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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A subsequent conviction beyond reasonable doubt by a petit jury "without disclosure 
of any prior criminal record" effectively establishes that the grand jury would have found 
probable cause even absent the challenged references. Id. at 695-96. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that these references rendered the entire grand jury 
proceeding unfair or significantly infringed on the grand jury's ability to exercise 
independent judgment. 
3. The prosecutor's comments on the evidence did not render 
the grand jury proceeding unfair. 
Defendant charges that the prosecutor in effect "participate[d] in the deliberations 
of the grand jury by expressing opinions on questions of fact, the weight of evidence, 
or the credibility of witnesses." Br. Aplt. at 43. He further complains that Detective 
Oliver attempted '\o convince the jurors that they should not only rely on Staples' testimony, 
but should choose the version that most aids the state . . ." Br. Aplt. at 49. 
Any such attempt by Oliver was obviously unavailing. Staples himself, testifying 
before the grand jury, disavowed the version that most aided the State. In the most 
incriminating version, Staples told police he saw defendant shoot Lisa Strong (R. 1746: 
96-97). However, in his live testimony before the grand jury, Staples testified only that 
he heard shots, emerged from the basement, and saw defendant holding a gun (R. 1746: 
52-57). 
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These differences were not lost on the grand jurors (see R. 1746: 97-99, 103, 112, 
118-20). One stated, "It kind of bothers me that Mike [Staples] changed his testimony 
from the original interview to what he told us today" (R. 1746: 110). In fact, near the 
end of the proceeding the grand jury had Staples brought back in order to ask him why 
he gave discrepant versions (R. 1746: 122-23). At that time, he admitted lying to police 
about seeing defendant firing the gun (R. 1746: 122). He said he did this so "they wouldn't 
threaten me any more. I just told them what they wanted to hear" (R. 1746: 123).17 
The prosecutor did not urge the grand jury to accept Staples' most incriminating 
version. Quite the contrary: when asked by a grand juror whether the prosecutor was 
"going to try and have [Mike Staples] stick to his first story," the prosecutor stated, "The 
thing about this case, like you say, you just have to take the witnesses the way they come 
to you. Sometimes they are good, and sometimes they are bad, and sometimes they are 
credible, and they are not" (R. 1746: 112). After noting that both versions of Staples' 
story put a gun in defendant's hand, the prosecutor acknowledged, "If all we had was 
the one witness, I don't think we would be here" (R. 1746: 113). 
Defendant also labels "pernicious" the prosecution's so-called "repeated attempts 
to sway the grand jurors to accept as credible one version of the many accounts Staples 
gave to authorities . . . " Br. Aplt. at 49. He refers in particular to statements by Detective 
17
 Grand jurors also quizzed Staples on his own possible culpability as an accomplice to 
the murder (R. 1746: 124). 
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Oliver. For example, when a grand juror asked "why that is legal to intimidate a potential 
witness," the prosecutor asked the detective to explain about taking the statement: 
Q. You take this additional statement from him? 
A. Right. Which J feel is a good statement We hit him cold. 
He had never been confronted with this before. He gave us a statement. 
When we told him he would have to testify against Forrest Whittle, who 
he admitted to us he is deathly afraid of, he started changing his story, 
wa[]vering from I wasn't even there, to I was in the house when it happened, 
to I don't even know what you guys are talking about. So he started wa[]vering 
in his testimony, or his version of what happened. I don't5 feel we 
intimidated him, or we may have gotten a little frustrated and said, "You 
can't keep changing your stories." 
(R. 1746: 100, emphasis added). In the context of Staples' changing stories, Oliver's 
statement that he feels one is good cannot have undermined the grand jury's independence. 
The other examples defendant cites, see Br. Aplt. at 48, follow this same pattern: 
a skeptical grand juror confronts the prosecution about Staples' vacillations, the detective 
explains why he feels Staples can stick to one story, and possibly refers once or twice 
to the fact that Staples has "wavered" in his accounts {see R. 1746: 101-02, 110-11). 
The comments defendant now attacks did not infringe on the grand jury's 
independence, because they were made in the context of the weakness of the Staples' 
credibility. Far from manipulating the grand jury, the prosecutor was candid about the 
tenuousness of his case. He noted that Staples' vacillation highlighted "the difficulty 
in the case," which was, he acknowledged, "a case, really, of credibility" (R. 746: 111). 
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And after all the comments that defendant claims disposed the jury against him, the 
following colloquy occurred: 
GRAND JUROR:... I want to know how you feel about serving an 
indictment. You think it is at the point where it would do society some good 
to actually have this man come to trial? 
MR. JONES: You can tell this is a hard case. If we have to go to 
trial on this one, this will not be an easy case to prosecute. And it will 
really boil down to a question of credibility. If the jury believes Mike Staples 
and Tina Schroyer and Tim ~ 
GRAND JUROR: Tina Schroyer ^eally seemed like --
MR. JONES: If they don't believe these people, we will probably 
lose it. We have got a family out there who wants something done, and 
law enforcement is trying to do something. Sometimes you got a great case. 
Sometimes you don't. 
(R. 1746: 130, emphasis added). Far from pressuring or manipulating the grand jury, 
the prosecutor's tone is apologetic as he explains that the fervor of the victim's family 
is pushing a borderline case to trial, where the State's witnesses may or may not be believed. 
Nor is it improper, as defendant suggests, for a prosecutor to express his opinion 
to a grand jury. In United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 
459 U.S. 1038 (1982), prosecutors "expressed their opinions on the credibility of some 
of the witnesses." The Fifth Circuit noted that presentation of the indictment itself informs 
the grand jury that prosecutors believe that an indictment should be returned. Id. "Thus, 
the fact that a prosecutor conveys such an impression to the grand jury does not require 
the dismissal of the indictment." Id. (citation omitted). "It is not improper . . . for an 
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attorney merely to state an opinion as to guilt or as to any fact at issue, as long as it is 
clear to the jury that the opinion is based only on the evidence that is before the jury 
and that the jury itself can evaluate." Id. (citation omitted). This was the case here: neither 
the prosecutor nor any prosecution witness implied that he knew defendant was guilty 
based on evidence not presented to the grand jury. 
Obviously, a prosecutor's statement of his opinion is not tantamount, as defendant 
argues, to "participating] in the deliberations of the grand jury." Br. Aplt. at 43. The 
State is aware of no authority, including the dated cases cited for the proposition by 
defendant, that equates commenting on the evidence with participating in the deliberations 
of the grand jury. See Hammers v. State, 337 P.2d 1097, 1107 (Okl. Cr. App. 1959) 
(prosecutor "cannot participate in the deliberations or express opinions on questions of 
fact"); State v. Good, 460 P.2d 662, 665 (Ariz. App. 1969) (same). 
Actually, by presenting the multiple versions of Staples' story, the prosecutor was 
exceeding his legal obligation: a prosecutor is not "obliged to present every exculpatory 
version of the facts to the grand jury." People v. Darrisaw, 614 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624 (Sup. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994) (citations omitted). "A Grand Jury hearing is not intended to be 
a 'mini-trial' at which competing evidence is weighed and questions of fact resolved; 
rather, its purpose is simply to determine whether the evidence proffered by the People, 
if fully credited, would support a conviction." Id. 
35 
Finally, the fact that grand jurors have, as here, "asked pointed questions about 
the direction of the investigation and injected their own opinions regarding the worth 
of the witnesses' testimony," weighs against a finding that a prosecutor's comment affected 
the grand jury's credibility evaluations. United States v. Azad, 809 F.2d 291, 294 (6th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987). 
In sum, the passages cited by defendant fall short of establishing fundamental 
unfairness or that the grand jury's independence was undermined. 
4. The prosecutor did not withhold from the grand jury 
"substantial and competent evidence negating the guilt" of 
defendant. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor "threatened the defendant's right to fundamental 
fairness by failing to present exculpatory evidence" in violation of Utah law. Br. Aplt. 
at 49 (underlining and capitalization omitted). He relies on UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-
13(5)(c) and article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Id}* 
The "exculpatory evidence" defendant refers to is that "the prosecutor failed to 
fully and accurately reveal to the grand jurors Staples' and Schroyer's numerous prior 
inconsistent statements," including the fact "that Staples had denied in a swom deposition 
having seen Whittle holding a gun immediately after the shooting." Br. Aplt. at 50-51. 
Defendant does not specify what inconsistent statements he relies upon. 
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 Because defendant offers no constitutional analysis, his state constitutional claim is not 
properly before this Court, see authorities cited in footnote 7 supra, and will not be addressed 
by the State. 
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With respect to the presentation of "exculpatory evidence, the federal rule is clear: 
"requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence would 
alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory 
body." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992) (reversing United States v. 
Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990)). "It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not 
to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing 
a criminal charge . . . and to make the assessment it has always been thought sufficient 
to hear only the prosecutor's side." Id. Thus, "neither in this country nor in England 
has the suspect under investigation by the grand jury ever been thought to have a right 
to testify, or to have exculpatory evidence presented." Id. 
By statute, Utah has adopted a different rule. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13(5)(c) 
(Supp. 1998) provides: 
When the attorney for the state or the special prosecutor is personally 
aware of substantial and competent evidence negating the guilt of a subject 
or target that might reasonably be expected to lead the grand jury not to indict, 
he shall present or otherwise disclose the evidence to the grand jury before 
the grand jury is asked to indict that person. 
The statute is carefully drawn. The evidence in question must (1) be within the prosecutor's 
personal knowledge; (2) be substantial and competent, (3) negate defendant's guilt, and 
(4) reasonably be expected to lead the grand jury not to indict. 
First, defendant has failed to establish that Staples' and Schroyer's prior inconsistent 
statements are "substantial" or that they negate defendant's guilt. The so-called 
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"exculpatory" evidence at issue here is pure impeachment evidence. Defendant argues 
that if the grand jury had "known the full extent and nature of his prior statements they 
reasonably could have been expected/' not to believe the prior exculpatory versions, 
but rather "to reject his testimony all together." Br. AplL at 51. But "the issue of whether 
impeachment evidence should be considered 'exculpatory' has never been addressed 
in Utah, and has not been resolved with any great consistency by other jurisdictions." 
State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 692 n.22 (Utah App. 1992) (discovery context). 
Furthermore, defendant has not and cannot establish that Staples' and Schroyer's 
prior inconsistent statements must "reasonably [have been] expected to lead the grand 
jury not to indict." A trial court determining a motion to dismiss an indictment, or an 
appellate court hearing an appeal from a dismissal, must engage in careful analysis in 
order to gauge the challenged testimony's effect. Here, the petit jury has already performed 
the analysis. Having heard all the versions of Staples' and Schroyer's stories that defense 
counsel cared to lay before them, they nevertheless returned a verdict of guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the prior inconsistent statements were insufficient to defeat a verdict 
of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, they were a fortiori insufficient to defeat a finding 
of probable cause. 
Because defendant has not established that the evidence was substantial or that 
it negated his guilt, and because the evidence lacked the impact to lead a grand jury not 
to indict, this claim fails. 
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5. The hearsay presented to the grand jury did not subvert the 
fundamental fairness of the proceeding or infringe on the 
grand jury's ability to make an independent judgment. 
Defendant claims that '"the prosecutor threatened the defendant's right to fundamental 
fairness by improperly presenting hearsay evidence to the grand jury." Br. Aplt. at 51 
(underlining and capitalization omitted). He cites chiefly to the testimony of Detective 
Mike George and Chuck Oliver. Id. at 53. 
The law is unclear. In Utah, the admission of hearsay is governed by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-10A-13(5)(a) (Supp. 1998): "The grand jury shall receive evidence without 
regard for the formal rules of evidence, except the grand jury may receive hearsay evidence 
only under the same provisions and limitations that apply to preliminary hearngs." Article 
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: "Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at 
any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined 
by statute or rule." 
No statute or rule currently defines "reliable hearsay." See also State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Utah 1995) (not reaching the question of the admissibility of 
"reliable hearsay" at preliminary hearings). Defendant argues that "[t]he only sensible 
reference is to the Rules of Evidence. Under this interpretation the Rules of Evidence 
apply to grand jury proceedings in defining what constitutes 'reliable hearsay."9 Br. 
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Aplt. at 52. Unlike the statute, rule 1101(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, would permit more 
hearsay in a grand jury proceeding than in a preliminary hearing. It provides: 
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) 
do not apply in the following situations: 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(5) In a preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed 
to prevent the admission of reliable hearsay evidence. 
In sum, the law governing the admissibility of hearsay in grand jury proceedings is unclear. 
If this case presented a question of admissibility, this Court might be required to 
clarify the rule. However, now that defendant has been convicted, admissibility is no 
longer the issue. Even under the standards defendant advocates, errors that are "procedural 
violations affecting only the probable cause charging decision by the grand jury" do not 
warrant reversal. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d at 1466. Rather, defendant must establish that 
the claimed errors threatened the "fundamental fairness" of the proceeding and that "the 
prosecutor engaged in flagrant or egregious misconduct," which "significantly infringed 
on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment." Id. Thus, the question 
is not one of mere admissibility, but of fundamental fairness. 
Admission of hearsay does not violate fundamental fairness. This is evident from 
the fact that hearsay is admissible before a federal grand jury. The Supreme Court has 
"declined to enforce the hearsay rule in grand jury proceedings, since that 'would run 
counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their 
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inquiries unfettered by technical rules.'" Williams, 504 U.S. at 49 (citing Costello v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 359, 364, 76 S.Ct. 406, 409 (1956)). Thus, "courts have universally 
refused to quash indictments based on the argument that the evidence before the grand 
jury was hearsay." United States * Rogers, 652 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1981). 
Consequently, admission of hearsay in a Utah grand jury proceeding cannot reasonably 
be said to threaten fundamental fairness or to significantly infringe on the grand jury's 
ability to exercise independent judgment. To hold otherwise would be to label all federal 
grand jury proceedings fundamentally unfair. 
Defendant cites United States v. Estepa, All F.2d 1132 (2nd Cir. 1972) for the 
proposition that grand jurors should not be led to believe they are getting first-hand 
information when they are not. See Br. Aplt. at 52. Estepa involved an indictment for 
narcotics violations based solely on the testimony of a police officer who, unbeknownst 
to the grand jury, had glimpsed from a remote location only a portion of the alleged drug 
transactions and filled in the rest of his narrative, including statements purportedly made 
by the defendants, with hearsay without disclosing his lack of first-hand knowledge. 
Id. at 1134-35. Nothing remotely similar occurred here. Defendant has identified no 
instance where the grand jurors mistook hearsay for non-hearsay. 
It has been held that "excessive use of hearsay evidence in a grand jury proceeding 
may violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The grand jury may not become 
'a rubber stamp endorsing the wishes of a prosecutor as a result of the needless presentation 
41 
of hearsay testimony in grand jury proceedings/" United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 
708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). 
This grand jury clearly did not become the prosecutor's "robber stamp." As noted 
above, they were active and probing. Moreover, coiBidering only the non-hearsay testimony 
of Mike Staples and Tina Schroyer, who were present at the crime scene when the murder 
was committed, it is difficult to see how any grand jury could have failed to indict. 
In sum, under Humphreys, Quas, and Mechanik, the petit jury's verdict of guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt cures the non-structural claims of error alleged here. Even 
if it did not, defendant has failed to establish that fundamental unfairness in the proceeding 
infringed on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION DID NOT RESULT FROM A SERIES 
OF ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULINGS 
Defendant claims that a combination of evidentiary errors and counsel ineffectiveness 
undermined the jury's verdict. Br. Aplt. at 56-57. 
A. The trial court properly excluded the recanted hearsay statements 
of James Sherrard on the ground that they were not against his 
interest and not trustworthy. 
Defendant assails the trial court for excluding hearsay statements made by defense 
witness James Sherrard, an inmate who refused to testify at trial. Br. Aplt. at 59. 
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Hearsay rule. At the center of this claim is rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
That rule is divided into two subsections: subsection (b) lists hearsay statements that 
are admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a witness; subsection (a) defines 
"unavailability as a witness." The rule reads in pertinent part (boldface added): 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, 
. . . is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's 
statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time 
of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, 
or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to 
render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable 
person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless 
believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any 
of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered 
as evidence of a material fact: (B) tlic statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent 
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these 
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence . . . 
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Defendant's trial strategy. In evaluating defendant's claim, context is crucial. 
The issue arose from defense counsel's strategy of (1) establishing Sherrard's unavailability 
as a witness, and (2) admitting his prior hearsay statements as statements against interest 
(see R. 1492). Defense counsel announced her intention to call James Sherrard, then 
added, "My understanding is that Mr. Sh[e]rrard would be taking the Fifth Amendment 
if he were called" (R. 1492). She proffered statements Sherrard had made to investigators 
Hattonward and Couch to the effect that he was at Tim Robinson's house the entire day 
of the murder, that he heard shots fired, and that "at no time during that day was Mr. 
Whittle present'" (R. 1492). Counsel argued that Sherrard's hearsay statements were 
admissible as statements against interest (804(c)) or under "the catch-all subsection for 
hearsay that has indicia of reliability" (R. 1492). She further argued that the hearsay 
statements were against Sherrard's interest because they placed him at the crime scene 
and excluded defendant from the pool of suspects (R. 1492). 
The prosecutor did not challenge Sherrard's unavailability. Rather, he argued that 
Sherrard's statement was not against interest, but was indistinguishable from any other 
eyewitness testimony (R. 1495-96). He argued further that Sherrard's statement was 
unreliable because Sherrard had disavowed it under oath in a civil deposition (R. 1496-97). 
The court ruled that the proffered statement did not qualify as a statement against 
interest for purposes of rule 804(3), and did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability or 
trustworthiness to qualify for admission under rule 804(5) (R. 1497). 
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In order to make a record, defense counsel then called Sherrard to the stand outside 
the jury's presence (R. 1497-98). Sherrard stated, "I take the Fifth and all this I told 
you already once. Ain't got nothing to say. What the hell is going on here? I told you 
this before, I have nothing to say. I don't know why you brought me down here in the 
first place" (R. 1499). Defense counsel did not request the court to order Sherrard to 
testify (seeR. 1497-1501). 
Motion at the conclusion of defense case. At the conclusion of the defense case, 
defendant again raised the issue of Sherrard's excluded hearsay statements. He requested 
"to have Mr. Sherrard brought to the Court to testify on the grounds that he was improperly 
allowed to plead the Fifth Amendment" (R 1570). Counsel reasoned that it v/as inconsistent 
for Sherrard to assert that the testimony he would give would incriminate him and yet 
"at the same time for it to be determined that he's not making statements against his 
interest; and therefore his testimony cannot come in at trial" (R. 1570). Counsel further 
argued that if, once called, Sherrard "were to refuse to testify," that his prior hearsay 
statement would be admissible "under Rule 801 as a prior inconsistent statement" (R. 
1570). 
The prosecutor stated, "I think we covered it yesterday, Judge. I think he's entitled 
to take the Fifth and no basis on which the comment or statement he made to someone 
should be admitted" (R. 1570). The court stated only, ''Okay. Very well" (R. 1570) 
and the trial proceeded with the State's rebuttal. 
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Motion for new trial. Defendant raised the issue a third time in a motion for a 
new trial. Defendant argued that the court should not have permitted Sherrard to assert 
his right to silence under the Fifth Amendment since he had waived that privilege by 
testifying under oath at a 1993 deposition regarding his earlier statements to investigators 
(R. 599). Moreover, defendant argued, if Sherrard's statements were not sufficiently 
incriminating to qualify as statements against interest under rule 804(3), as the trial court 
had ruled, they were not sufficiently incriminating to qualify for protection under the 
Fifth Amendment (R. 600). 
In the hearing on defendant's motion, the prosecutor reminded the court of facts 
indicating that defendant was "directly responsible for James Sherrard taking the Fifth 
Amendment" (R. 1716-17). As defendant had walked past Sherrard's holding cell during 
trial he "made a comment to Mr. Sherrard, something to the effect, cDo the right thing,' 
or, 'I'll do the right thing for you.' Certainly," the prosecutor argued, "the statement 
could have been interpreted as either a threat or a suggestion that if you help me, I'll 
help you" (R. 1713). This created a situation, the prosecutor observed, where defendant 
himself caused the very silence that he was attempting to use as a reason to admit Sherrard's 
prior hearsay (R. 1713). 
The prosecutor also reasserted his argument that Sherrard's hearsay statements 
were neither against interest nor reliable (R. 1714-16). 
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The trial court found that trial defense counsel, "for whatever reason perhaps for 
tactical reasons, did not request that the court require Mr. Sherrard to testify" (R. 654). 
Indeed, the court noted, Sherrard's invocation of the Fifth Amendment 'Svas the foundation 
for their argument that Mr. Sherrard was unavailable as a witness" (R. 654). Hence, 
the court ruled, "defendant has now waived that objection" (R. 654). 
Defendant's claims on appeal. First, defendant claims that "Sherrard was improperly 
allowed to take the Fifth Amendment." Br. Aplt. at 62 (capitalization and underlining 
omitted). Second, he claims that "Sherrard should have been forced to take the stand. 
Once he took the stand, if he recanted or cJaimed to have forgotten or denied making 
his prior statements, defendant would have been able to introduce his prior statements 
to Hattonward and Couch as substantive evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules 
of Evidence." Br. Aplt. at 63. Finally, defendant argues that c*[i]f Sherrard refused to 
testify despite an order of the court to do so, he would then be technically unavailable 
pursuant to Rule 804(a)(2). At that point Rule 804(b)(3) or (5) would be applicable;' 
Br. Aplt. at 63. 
1. Any error in permitting Sherrard to take the Fifth 
Amendment was unpreserved, invited, and favored defendant. 
Claim of trial court error. Defendant's claim that Sherrard should not have been 
allowed to take the Fifth Amendment fails for at least three reasons. 
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First, defendant failed to preserve this claim of error by eliciting a ruling from 
the trial court. The court did not rule that Sherrard could legally take the Fifth Amendment. 
It did not need to, since the prosecutor tacitly accepted the defense claim that Sherrard 
was unavailable by reason of having taken the Fifth Amendment (see 1495-96). 
"[I]t is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on the objection, or such 
objection is waived on appeal." State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citation omitted). See also Cunningham v. 
Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 n.2 (Utah 1984); State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah 
App. 1989); Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989). Consequently, this 
claim is waived.19 
Second, any error was invited. Defendant called Sherrard for the express purpose 
of Sherrard's rendering himself unavailable by taking the Fifth Amendment as a predicate 
to admitting his prior hearsay statements. Accordingly, if permitting him to do so was 
error, the error was invited. Counsel may not affirmatively lead the court into taking 
19
 Defendant did argue at the close of the defense case that Sherrard should not have been 
allowed to take the Fifth Amendment because doing so was inconsistent with the court's 
ruling that his prior hearsay statements were not statements against interest (see R. 1570). 
However, this argument asserts a different ground than those claimed on appeal and so does 
not preserve them. SeeTolmanv. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d457,460 (Utah App. 
1996) (objection must "be specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error" 
complained of). The first time defendant asserted this "very error" was in a motion for new 
trial, when it was ruled untimely (see R. 654). 
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a particular action and then challenge that action on appeal. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). 
Finally, any error was in defendant's favor. Because Sherrard had both inculpated 
and exculpated defendant under oath his trial testimony was anyone's guess. In contrast, 
his statements to Hattonward and Couch were both fixed and exculpatory. Admitting 
the prior hearsay statements was thus far preferable, from a defense standpoint, to admitting 
Sherrard's live testimony. The first step toward seeking admission of those statements 
was to have Sherrard declared unavailable. Sherrard's assertion of his right to silence 
under the Fifth Amendment rendered him unavailable. 
If the trial court had refused to permit Sherrard to take the Fifth Amendment, as 
defendant now claims it should have, the ruling would have stymied defendant's strategy 
for admitting his prior hearsay statements. Since any trial court error was in defendant's 
favor, he suffered no prejudice and so is not entitled to reversal on this ground. See Utah 
R. Evid. 103 (a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which adits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected"). 
Ineffectiveness claim. Defendant asserts in the alternative that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for not objecting to Sherrard's taking the Fifth Amendment at trial. Br. 
Aplt. at 64.20 
20
 As noted above, defense counsel did object on this ground, but the objection was 
untimely. 
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"[A] defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the difficult burden 
of showing actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice." State v. Tyler, 
850 P.2d 1250, 1259 (Utah 1993); see Strickland v, Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); 
State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 89 (1998). When 
reviewing counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 
P.2d at 685 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. 689 (1984)). 
In order to meet the prejudice requirement, defendant must show that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair and reliable trial. Id. at 687; State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This in turn requires a shoving that "there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. 
Defendant's claim fails because the record supports the trial court's surmise that 
defense counsel's non-objection was tactical (see R. 654). Far from objecting to Sherrard's 
assertion of the privilege at trial, counsel called him for that very purpose, with the result 
that he thereby become '^ unavailable" for purposes of rule 804(a). As noted above, neither 
the prosecutor nor the trial court questioned Sherrard's unavailability. Thus, not only 
was this strategy reasonable, it was successful. 
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Consequently, defendant has failed to overcome the heavy presumption that this 
strategy was reasonable. Nor has he demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of a different 
trial result had counsel not permitted Sherrard to assert his right to silence. Accordingly, 
defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails. 
2. The trial court had no sua sponte duty to force a defense 
witness to take the stand. 
Claim of trial error. On appeal defendant proposes a different strategy: "Sherrard 
should have been forced to take the stand. Once he took the stand, if he recanted or 
claimed to have forgotten or denied making his prior statements, defendant would have 
been able to introduce his prior statements to Hattonward and Couch as substantive evidence 
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence." Br. Aplt. at 63. 
Defendant does not specify who should bave "forced" Sherrard to take the stand. 
If he is claiming that the court had an affirmative duty to "force" Sherrard to take the 
stand, the claim is unpreserved and groundless. Defendant did not ask the court to require 
Sherrard to take the stand (R. 1718, 1734-35). Defendant cites no legal authority, and 
the State is aware of none, holding that a trial court commits error by not sua sponte 
"forcing" a defense witness to take the stand. 
Moreover, defendant's arguments overlooks the fact that Sherrard did take the stand; 
after answering a few innocuous questions he refused to testify further (R. 1498-1501). 
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Nor has defendant established prejudice. He speculates that if Sherrard had been 
put on the stand before the jury and "recanted or claimed to have forgotten or denied 
making his prior statements, defendant could have been able to introduce his prior statements 
. . . pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1), Ulah Rules of Evidence." Br. Aplt. at 63. 
In effect, defendant is proposing a revisionist strategy for admitting Sherrard's 
hearsay, relying on rule 801(d)(1) rather than rule 804(b). Rule 801(d)(1) applies when 
"[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing . . ." Yet defendant offers no basis to 
believe that Sherrard would have testified at all. Sherrard was an inmate in the State 
penitentiary (R. 1491). The State proffered evidence that defendant's threats or promises 
procured Sherrard's silence; defendant speculates that Robinson's threats intimidated 
him (see R. 1713, 1716, 1731, Br. Aplt. at 63). In either case, any implication that a 
ruling against his Fifth Amendment claim or a threat of contempt would have induced 
Sherrard to testify strains credulity. In fact, the prosecutor stated below without 
contradiction that since Sherrard was "already doing time at the Utah State Prison," holding 
him in contempt "certainly isn't going to have any impact on him" (R. 1718-19). 
Acknowledging this possibility, defendant states that "[i]f Sherrard refused to testify 
despite an order of the court to do so, he would then be technically unavailable pursuant 
to Rule 804(a)(2). At that point Rule 804(b)(3) or (5) would be applicable." Br. Aplt. 
at 63. Of course, Sherrard was treated as unavailable by virtue of his assertion of his 
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Fifth Amendment right to silence. Thus defendant seems to be contending nothing more 
than that the court found Sherrard unavailable for the wrong reason. 
Defendant also devotes two sentences to challenging the trial court's ruling that 
Sherrard's prior hearsay statements did not satisfy the requirements of rule 804(b)(3) 
and (5): "His statement against Robinson was clearly against his interest in the sense 
that any prison inmate who testifies against another inmate risks being labeled a 'snitch.' 
Prisoners who are considered snitches are often not treated well by other inmates in general." 
Br. Aplt. at 63. 
This argument was not preserved. Although the same passage appears in defendant's 
memorandum in support of a new trial (R. 602), the trial court correctly ruled that the 
claim of error had been waived by defendant's failure to timely assert it (R. 654). 
In addition, this argument is inadequately briefed. Defendant's brief cites to relevant 
authority—rule 804(b)(3)—but does not quote or attempt to apply its terms to the facts 
of this case. See Br. Aplt. at 63. Some explication would seem to be required, inasmuch 
as on its face, the rule's definition of "statement against interest" excludes the fear of 
becoming labeled a "snitch."21 
21
 Rule 804(b)(3) reads: 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to 
(continued...) 
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A brief that contains relevant legal authorities, but pays ~scant attention" to the 
facts and provides "no actual analysis of those facts in light of the legal authorities 
excerpted" does not comply with rule 24(a)(9). Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 
960, 962 (Utah App.) (dicta), cert, denied, 765 R2d 1278 (Uiah 1988); see also Utah 
R. App P. 24(a)(9). An appellee should not be required "to construct and then rebut 
the unbriefed issue." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854 n.l (Utah 1992). Accordingly, 
this Court should decline to consider this argument. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 
960, 966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
This argument lacks merit in any event. As noted above, rule 804(b)(3)'s definition 
of "statement against interest" excludes fear of being labeled a "snitch." See note 
19 herein. Defendant offers no reason to read an additional category into the plain 
language of that rule. 
Ineffective assistance. Although defendant charges his counsel with ineffective 
assistance for not objecting to Sherrard\s taking the Fifth Amendment, he does not claim 
they acted deficiently by not timely requesting the court to force Sherrard to take the 
stand and thus be deemed unavailable pursuant to rale 804(a)(2). See Br. Aplt. at 64-66. 
Any such claim would lack merit in any event. Defense counsel established Sherrard's 
21
 (...continued) 
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
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unavailability under rule 804(a)(1). Their failure to establish it also under rule 804(a)(2) 
was inconsequential. 
B. The trial court properly admitted Derald Ross's testimony that 
defendant told him he killed a woman in Utah with a .38. 
In about December 1994, while serving time in Gunnison for receiving and transferring 
a stolen vehicle, Derald Ross shared a cell with defendant (R. 1259-61, 1267). At trial, 
Ross testified that defendant told him that "he used a .38 caliber to kill a woman here 
in Utah" and that "he wasn't too concerned about the gun because the police would never 
find it" (R. 1278-79). He also testified that defendant had told him that the night of the 
homicide "they had been partying and drinking and doing drugs" (R. 127c). 
1. Defendant's statement that he killed a woman in Utah was highly 
probative and not prejudicial. 
Defendant moved to exclude Ross's testimony on the ground that, because the 
statement was "vague" and lacked detail as to time or place, its probative value was "very 
weak" and its potential for prejudice was "quite high" (R. 1268). After voir dire of Ross 
consuming nine transcript pages, the court denied defendant's motion (R. 1259-68, 1277). 
On appeal defendant claims that because the statement lacked any reference to 
time, location, or the victim's name it was of "scant or cumulative probative force" and 
was only admitted "for the sake of its prejudicial effect." Br. Aplt. at 68. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: "Although relevant, evidence ma> 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
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prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" (emphasis added). 
Evidence "is unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense 
of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or otherwise may cause the jury to base its 
decision on something other than the established propositions in the case." State v. Mawrer, 
770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The probative value of this statement was high. "[EJvidence of a confession of 
the crime charged is highly relevant and probative. Although it is also highly prejudicial 
to the defense, the inquiry is not whether the evidence is harmful to the strategy of the 
party opposing its introduction. Any evidence is prejudicial to the party whose theory 
of the case it contradicts." State v. Rhoades, 809 P.2d 455, 465 (Idaho 1991). 
Conversely, the risk of unfair prejudice was low. Defendant's statement that he 
had killed a woman in Utah, related at trial by Ross, did not suggest to the jury an improper 
basis for a verdict of guilty. Defendant does not argue, nor is there any basis to argue, 
that the jury might have believed his statement to Ross referred to a Utah woman other 
than Lisa Strong and thus be inadmissible evidence of another crime. See Br. Aplt. at 
68. The trial record is replete with evidence that defendant killed Lisa Strong and makes 
no reference to the death of any other Utah woman. Accordingly, the only reasonable 
inference possible from Ross's testimony was that defendant was confessing his murder 
of Lisa Strong. Consequently, the resulting prejudice was fair, not unfair. 
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Defendant also claims prejudice in the fact that "the prosecutor did not inform 
the jury that Mr. Ross was a cellmate of the defendant at the time the alleged incriminating 
statement was made. Instead, Ross was portrayed as a 'construction worker and the man 
who works part-time as a tow truck driver' (R. 1661)." Br. Aplt. at 68. 
This claim is ironic considering the care that the court and prosecutor took to keep 
from the jury the potentially prejudicial fact that Ross and defendant had been cellmates 
{see, e.g., R. 1253-57, 1277). If defendant had wanted that fact before the jury, defense 
counsel could easily have brought it out on cross-examination. Instead, while emphasizing 
on cross-examination that Ross had been convicted of a felony, counsel referred gingerly 
to the fact that he and defendant had "resided together for about two months" (R. 1280-81). 
2. Defendant cannot complain that the prosecution failed to 
disclose, or his counsel to discover, a matter within his 
personal knowledge. 
Defendant timely moved to exclude Ross's testimony under rule 16(g), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the State had failed to provide notes of witness 
interviews (R. 1268). Defendant did not seek a continuance in order to prepare to meet 
Ross's testimony, but argued that it would be "appropriate to sanction the State for their 
failure to comply with discovery by not permitting [Ross] to testify" (R. 1269). The 
prosecutor countered that no such notes existed (R. 1269). After voir dire of the state's 
investigator, the court denied the motion to exclude (R. 1277). 
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In a motion for new trial, defense counsel argued that the State had withheld 
information about its witness Derald Ross. Specifically, they argued that %t[b]ecause 
the defense was not told about Ross until two weeks prior to trial, there was not sufficient 
time to request Ross's prison jacket, conduct the appropriate hearings, and sort through 
the information" (R. 607). The State argued that it had satisfied rule 16, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and the requirements of State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 
by sending defendant 1,346 pages of information and 150 photographs, by directing 
defendant to contact law enforcement agencies for additional information, and, one week 
before trial, furnishing the defense with the prosecutor's work-product notes on three 
witnesses, including Ross, for whom no police reports existed (R. 585-88). Ross "testified 
to precisely what was contained within the prosecutor's notes" (R. 588). 
When asked in oral argument to specify what information counsel claimed prejudiced 
the defense, counsel responded that the most important fact was "the altercation between 
Mr. Whittle and Mr. Ross and what was the nature of the altercation and when it occurred" 
(R. \10%; see also R. 1709-11). 
Claim of trial court error. The trial court ruled that "there was no violation of 
discovery rules" (R. 655). Moreover, the court stated that **[t]he only item of evidence 
that defendant can point to . . . that defense counsel did not have knowledge of prior 
to trial or prior to the witnesses' testimony before the jury was the fact that Mr. Ross, 
a cellmate of defendant on one occasion had an altercation with Mr. Whittle over Mr. 
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Whittle's request for sexual favors from Mr. Ross" (R. 655). The court concluded that 
"had this information been known to the jury it could not reasonably have made a difference 
in the outcome of the trial" (R. 655). 
Although the trial court's ruling was correct, the easier route here is to affirm on 
an alternative ground. See O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279, 280 
(Utah 1998). Defendant's claim is defeated by the obvious and decisive fact that even 
if defense counsel was unaware of the altercation between defendant and Ross until shortly 
before Ross testified, defendant himself knew about it. Moreover, there was no showing 
at trial that the prosecutor knew about the altercation. Thus, defendant on appeal asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction on the ground that the prosecutor, who may not have 
known about the altercation, did not disclose it to the defendant, who did. 
"There is substantial authority that the prosecutor cannot be cited for a discovery 
violation where the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the item that the State 
failed to disclose." State v. White, 931 S.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Mo. App. 1996) (citing 
Hughes v. Hopper, 629 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 933, 101 S.Ct. 
1396 (1981)). See also Jennette v. State, 398 S.E.2d 734, 738 (Ga. App. 1990) ("The 
Brady rule applies only to exculpatory material unknown to the appellant"). 
In addition, defendant does not challenge the court's conclusion that the information 
at issue would not have altered the jury's verdict. Br. Aplt. at 70. Accordingly, any 
possible error was not prejudicial. 
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Claim of ineffective assistance. Defendant states that if this Court concludes that 
the failure to obtain information about the altercation between himself and Ross "was 
a result of defense counsel's failure to make timely requests, then Defendant would 
reluctantly claim that his counsel were legally ineffective." Br. Aplt. at 71. 
This claim fails because defendant himself knew of the altercation. A defendant 
may not withhold information from his counsel and then charge them with ineffectiveness 
for not having discovered it without his assistance. "In general, counsel is not ineffective 
for failing to discover evidence about which the defendant knows but withholds from 
counsel." Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States 
v. King, 936 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1008 (1991). 
The record indicates that it was defendant, not his counsel, whose performance 
was deficient here. Defendant knew that he had participated in the prison scuffle. Having 
failed to disclose that fact to his counsel, he cannot now charge them with ineffectiveness 
for having failed to discover it by other means. 
C. Since the record suggests no other homicide to which defendant 
might have been referring, his statement that he "capped a bitch" 
was not ambiguous and thus properly admitted under State v. Troyer. 
The murder of Lisa Strong occurred in May of 1986. Douglas Bateman and Terence 
Robison testified that in the summer of 1986, in a Salt Lake City body shop, defendant 
said, "I capped a bitch downtown" (R. 1211-12, 1228-29). Janet Bateman, Doug Bateman's 
wife, testified that he recounted this comment to her that night (R. 1213-14, 1221). 
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Defendant claims that admission of this testimony violated rule 403, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Br. Aplt. at 72-73, see also 68. Rule 403 claims are reviewed under a 
deferential standard dictating affirmance unless the trial court exceeded the limits of 
reasonability. State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 930 
(Utah 1997). 
Defendant relies exclusively on State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1995), 
see Br. Aplt. at 72-73. Despite defendant's claim of preservation, Br. Aplt. at 72, at 
trial defendant did not assert this Troyer argument {see R. 801-10). Consequently, he 
did not preserve it. See Tolman, 912 P.2d at 460, and it is now too late to invoke an 
exception to the preservation requirement. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5 (where 
appellant "does not argue that 'exceptional circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review 
of the issue, [this Court will] decline to consider it on appeal"). 
Furthermore, since Troyer is distinguishable, the claim lacks merit in any event. 
Troyer was charged with murder of an 80-year old woman. Id. at 1184-85. When asked 
if he knew why he was being arrested, Troyer responded that he had "escape[d] from 
prison" because "he had attempted to rape a 60-year old woman" and "[h]e was getting 
nervous because people were asking him questions about it." Id. at 1184. In fact, Troyer 
had pled guilty to attempted rape of an elderly woman in 1979. Id. at 1191. Troyer's 
statement was thus "highly ambiguous": it may have referred either to this prior crime 
or the charged crime. Id. The trial court excluded the statement, reasoning that admitting 
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it would have forced Troyer to acknowledge his prior conviction in order to dispel the 
inference that his statement referred to the crime charged. Id. This Court affirmed Id. 
at 1195. 
Troyer is distinguishable. The decisive fact in Troyer was that Troyer's statement 
was ambiguous: it might have referred to the charged crime or it might have referred 
to a crime to which he earlier pled guilty. This ambiguity forced upon Troyer the Hobson's 
choice of acknowledging his prior crime or allowing the jury to read the statement as 
referring to the charged crime. Defendant faced no such dilemma. He never pled guilty 
to killing any other Salt Lake woman, nor does the record indicate that he had committed 
another homicide before summer 1986 to which his incriminating statement might refer. 
Nor dies the lack of specificity in defendant's statement bar its admission. Troyer's 
statement was vague: it was not specific as to time, location, or victim. But it was not 
problematical because it was vague, as defendant claims. See Br. Aplt. at 72. In fact, 
the term vague does not appear in the Troyer opinion. Troyer's statement was problematical 
because it was ambiguous—it could refer to one of two possible crimes. Because 
defendant's statements here were not ambiguous, Troyer is inapposite. 
The contrary rule—that any incriminating statement that did not specify time, place 
and victim is inadmissible—would be grossly unfair, permitting defendants to exclude 
statements simply by theorizing the possibility of some other crime to which they might 
refer, even though no other such crime was ever committed. 
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D. James Bell's testimony that the police had relied on Tina Schroyer's 
testimony in a previous case was properly admitted to impeach 
his testimony that she was an unreliable informant. 
James Bell ran the task force assigned to the Lisa Strong murder (R. 1522). In 
the course of his investigation, Bell talked to Tina Schroyer (R. 1532). At trial, Bell 
was a defense witness. He testified, "Her stories changed through the course of interviews" 
(R. 1532). According to Bell, Schroyer never told him that defendant was ever at her 
house with a gun or that defendant confessed the murder to her (R. 1533). 
On cross-examination, Bell left the clear impression that Schroyer was an unreliable 
witness, referring for example to "the numerous stories she gave us" (R. 1546). The 
prosecutor then asked, "Now, isn't it true that Tina Schroyer has helped you satisfactorily 
solve another homicide?" Bell answered "Yes" (R. 1547). Defendant objected on relevancy 
grounds (R. 1547). After an off-the-record sidebar discussion, the prosecutor was again 
allowed to ask, "She gave you information that ultimately led to the conviction of somebody 
else on another homicide; isn't that true?" Bell answered "Yes" (R. 1547-48). 
Defense counsel made a record of the sidebar discussion, which was a defense 
objection on relevancy grounds (R. 1554). The court observed that the testimony might 
tend to impeach Bell, "inasmuch as he was attempting to make her out as . . . lacking 
in credibility and that they had . . . relied on her testimony on prior occasions" (R. 1555). 
Alleged trial court error. Defendant claims that this testimony was irrelevant. 
Br. Aplt. at 75 (citing Utah R. Evid. 401). On the contrary, the fact that a police investigator 
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has used a particular witness to solve other crimes had a tendency to dispel the impression 
left by his earlier testimony that he believed she was not a reliable informant. Obviously, 
that an informant has proved reliable in the past is a factor relevant to assessing that 
informant's present reliability. See, e.g., State v. Espinozay 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1986); State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983). 
Ineffective assistance claim. Defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 
in cursory fashion, claiming that his trial counsel should have objected to Bell's testimony 
under rule 608(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37 (Utah 1996). 
See Br. Aplt. at 76. 
An ineffective assistance claim cannot rest upon counsel's failure to object to 
admissible evidence. See State v. Codianna, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983). Nor 
does an attorney perform outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance 
by not objecting to evidence that is "arguably admissible/' Chatham v. State, 889 S.W.2d 
345, 352 (Tex. App. 1994). See also Morris v. State, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir.) ("An 
attorney's failure to object to the admission of inadmissible evidence is not necessarily 
ineffective/'), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 831 (1992); United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136, 
1146 (7th Cir.) ("failure to object to evidence that though prejudicial, is probably admissible, 
clearly qualifies as falling within the realm of tactics''), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); 
Rice v. State, 753 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. App. 1988) ("Mere failure to object to questionable 
evidence or argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel, without more."). 
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Rule 608(b) does not support the objection defendant claims his counsel should 
have made. The challenged testimony was admissible under the rule's provision that 
specific instances of the conduct of a witness may "in the discretion of the court, if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness 
. . . (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness 
as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified." 
Hovater is also weak support at best for the objection defendant now claims his 
counsel should have made. Hovater involved a prosecutor's bolstering his own witness's 
credibility through the testimony of a friendly witness on direct examination; the case 
at bar involves a prosecutor attempting on cross-examination to mitigate damage to his 
witness's credibility inflicted by the witness currently under cross-examination. 
Moreover, Hovater was decided only six days before defendant's trial began. 
Compare R. 968 with Hovater, 914 P.2d 37. %To establish a claim of ineffectiveness 
based on an oversight or misreading of law, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 
why, on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's 
performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993) (rejecting 
ineffectiveness claim premised on opinion decided after trial). See also Komahrens v. 
Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1360 (4th Cir. 1995) C*the case law is clear that an attorney's assistance 
is not rendered ineffective because he failed to anticipate a new rule of law"), cert, denied, 
116 S. Ct. 2541 (1996); Randolph v. Delo, 952 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1991) (ruling 
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that trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise Batson challenge two days before 
Batson was decided), cert, denied, 504 U.S. 920 (1992); Babbs v State, 62 i N.E.2d 326, 
331 (Ind. App. 1993) ("An attorney is not required to anticipate changes in the law and 
object accordingly"). 
Since Hovater was technically decided prior to defendant's trial, it is not foreclosed 
as a basis for an ineffective assistance claim; however, the fact that no lawyers except 
those representing the parties in Hovater would have received a copy of the opinion must 
figure into the calculus of whether defendant's trial counsel acted reasonably. 
In view of the foregoing, and the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Taylor, 947 P.2d at 685, 
defendant has not established that his trial counsel's non-objection to the challenged 
testimony was unreasonable. 
Furthermore, defendant has failed to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Templin. 805 P.2d at 187. The chance that his 
conviction hung on the testimony in question is remote at best. 
E. Defense counsel were not deficient for not objecting to admission 
of Tina Schroyer's identification of defendant, since it was not 
hearsay under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting on hearsay 
grounds to certain testimony given by Tina Schroyer. Br. Aplt. at 76-79. After having 
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been impeached on the basis of previous inconsistent statements, Schroyer agreed on 
redirect that she had told the grand jury "that the person that you saw run by your house 
after you heard the dogs barking was Forrest Whittle" and that she had testified at a 
deposition "that the person [she] saw running by the house was Forrest Whittle" (R. 1425). 
Finally, she agreed that she had testified on two other occasions under oath "that the 
person [she] saw running by the house . . . was Forrest Whittle" (R. 1425). 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these 
statements under rule 801(d)(1)(B). Br. Aplt. at 78-79. However, any objection would 
have been futile since the testimony was admissible as non-hearsay under rule 801(d)(1)(C). 
That subsection provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statements by the witness. The declarant testifies at the trial 
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and 
the statement is . . . (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving 
the person . . . 
In each of the challenged statements, Schroyer identified the person she saw running 
by her house as defendant. Accordingly, those statements were not hearsay. 
Since an ineffective assistance claim cannot rest upon counsel's failure to object 
to admissible evidence, see Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109, this claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on ( I January 1999. 
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CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER, 
a First Degree Felony, at 
800 East and Kensington, 
Ave., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on or about May 12, 
1986, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES: 
Count 1 
On or about May 12, 1986, at 800 East and Kensington Avenue, 
in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
FORREST LEE WHITTLE 
did commit Criminal Homicide, Murder, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, FORREST LEE WHITTLE, a 
party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly caused the death 
of LISA STRONG; and/or intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
Grand Jury Indictment 
Page 2 
another, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
caused the death of Lisa Strong; and/or acting under circumstances 
evidencing depraved indifference to human life, engaged in conduct 
which created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby caused 
the death of LISA STRONG. 
A TRUE BILL: 
FOREMAN ON THE GRAND JURY 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
ERNEST W. JONES 
Deputy District Attorney 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Forrest Lee Whittle, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO: 951900481 FS 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The court has reviewed defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment together with the 
memos filed in connection with the motion and in addition has reviewed portions of the 
transcript of the grand jury proceedings, and now rules as follows: 
The defendant claims numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct and that each 
individual instance or an accumulation of all of the complained of instances has denied him due 
process and the right to a fair and unbiased grand jury. Defendant further claims that he is 
entitled to a preliminary hearing and lastly claims that unauthorized personnel were in the grand 
jury proceedings, namely a bailiff employed by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs department. 
The court is of the opinion that some of the prosecutor's statements to the jury regarding 
other murders that may be solved if the jury indicts and the statements of the State's principal 
witness regarding his own personal opinions and beliefs in analyzing the evidence for the jury 
(such comments occurred on more than one occasion and after the first such instance the 
STATE V. WHITTLE PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
prosecutor could have, in some appropriate fashion, cautioned its principal witness) may 
arguable be inappropriate. Nevertheless, the court is of the opinion that the defendant has failed 
to establish actual prejudice from any of these instances or from an accumulation of all of them. 
It cannot be said, based on this record, that the prosecutor's alleged misconduct substantially 
influenced the grand jury's decision to indict. There was substantial evidence upon which the 
grand jury could indict. It is obvious to the court upon a reading of the transcript that this grand 
jury's will was not overborne in any way by the prosecutor, and it is clear that the grand jury's 
exercise of independent judgment was not significantly infringed by the prosecutor's conduct. 
The court is further of the opinion that under the law the defendant, having been indicted 
by a grand jury is not entitled to a preliminary hearing. 
Lastly, it appears that the individual who defendant initially thought was an unauthorized 
person in the courtroom at the time of the grand jury proceedings, was not present and that issue 
therefore is moot. 
For the reasons stated above the court denies the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment. 
The District Attorney's office is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this (j^K day of October, 1995. ^ ' 
fyz****—-t£-— v 
Frank G. Noel <L j> . 
District Court Judge 0 T * 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
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of the remarks or from an accumulation of all of remarks by the 
prosecutor or the witnesses. 
4. The alleged misconduct did not substantially influence the 
Grand Jury in its decision to indict. 
5. There was substantial evidence upon which the grand jury 
could indict the defendant. The Grand Jury's judgment was not 
significantly infringed by the prosecutor's conduct in this case. 
6. The individual who the defendant thought was in the 
courtroom (Kevin Taylor - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office) was 
not present during the Grand Jury proceedings. 
Based on the Findings of Fact the Court enters the following 
Conclusion of Laws: 
1. Defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing because 
he was indicted by a Grand Jury. 
2. The Grand Jury proceedings were legal and appropriate. 
The defendant suffered no actual prejudice from the proceedings. 
3. The defendant's Motion to Quash the Indictment is denied. 
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
Chad WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 97-3201. 
Uinii in MI HI1 i nun i i\npt ais» I enth Circuit. 
1 Jov 4, 1998. 
PORFILIO, BRORBY, anil MURPHY, Circuit 
Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
p^* xhis order and judgment is not binding 
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This 
court generally disfavors the citation of orders and 
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment 
may be cited under the terms and conditions of 
10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
P u k H I h I . . . . • 
*1 Chad Washington was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The principal 
evidence against him was nearly 500 grams of that 
substance found in a safe bearing Mr. Washington's 
palm print, a tape recording in which he discussed 
the cocaine, and large amounts of cash found on his 
person and in his cars. Mr. Washington challenges 
much of this evidence. On appeal, he argues: (1) the 
cumulative effect of governmental misconduct 
before the district court deprived him of his 
Constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of 
Copr. © West 1998 No C 
law; (2) the district court erred in failing to exclude 
evidence on his prior convictions and cash 
possession; (3) the district court erred in instructing 
the jury on aiding and abetting; (4) the district court 
erred in failing to properly define "intent" in its 
instructions to the jury; (5) the district court erred in 
overruling his objections to sentencing; and (6) the 
district court erred in denying a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence. Finding no prejudicial 
error, we affirm. 
On April 30, 1996, Wichita, Kansas police officers 
executed a search warrant at 1545 North Pershing, 
the residence of co-defendant Sharron Griffin. 
During the search, officers located crack cocaine in 
two bedrooms and in the safe found in her living 
room closet. The cocaine in the safe was packaged 
in seventeen bags, each of which weighed 
approximately one ounce. Taken together, all the 
cocaine found in the house weighed 479.6 grams. 
Ms. Griffin was arrested for possession with intent 
to sell cocaine. 
Following her arrest, Ms. Griffin denied ownership 
of the safe and told the police that Mr. Washington 
had brought the safe to her home. A palm print 
lifted from the safe matched that of Mr. 
Washington. Ms. Griffin agreed to cooperate with 
police. 
At the suggestion of the police, Ms. Griffin used a 
tape recorder to record a conversation in which she, 
her sister, and Mr. Washington discussed the safe 
and its contents. After recording the conversation, 
Ms. Griffin returned to her home, rewound the tape, 
and listened to be sure she had captured Mr. 
Washington's voice. She then telephoned Detective 
Riniker of the Wichita Police Department who asked 
Ms. Griffin if she had remembered to record, either 
at the beginning or end of the tape, her name, and 
the date and time of the conversation with Mr. 
Washington. Believing she was at the end of the 
tape, Ms. Griffin recorded the information. As it 
turned out, she had recorded over pai t of her 
conversation with Mr. Washington. 
Soon after adding her name, date, and lime, Ms, 
Griffin turned the tape over to Detective Riniker. In 
the surviving portion of the tape, Mr. Washington 
neither expressly admits nor denies ownership of the 
to Orig, IJ.S tn>\i, Works 
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safe and its contents; however, he does suggest to 
Ms. Griffm that she tell police that another 
individual owned the safe. 
As the case was developed, Mr. Washington was 
connected to two critical addresses and one vehicle. 
He owned property at 2253 S. Belmont which he 
deeded to his mother and girlfriend prior to his 
arrest. He also claimed residence at 133 W. May, # 
504. The addresses and the vehicle assume 
importance because of what was seized from each. 
*2 At 2253 S. Belmont, police found an Infinity 
Q45 automobile they claimed belonged to Mr. 
Washington from which they took $38,900. 
Although Mr. Washington argued the car did not 
belong to him and the cash found inside belonged to 
his mother and her cousin, documents found inside 
the vehicle established Mr. Washington had paid for 
repairs to that vehicle. Further, an Infinity key had 
been found during the search of 2253 S. Belmont. 
A. 
Mr. Washington's first allegation of error is that he 
was denied due process because the police destroyed 
a portion of the audio tape that was admitted into 
evidence. We review for clear error the district 
court's determination that the government did not 
destroy potentially exculpatory evidence in bad faith. 
United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1451 (10th 
Cir.1995). 
As he did in the district court, Mr. Washington -
argues law enforcement officers listened to the tape 
and knew its content prior to the partial destruction. 
Mr. Washington has provided no support for his 
contention. 
Government actors have a duty to preserve 
evidence that is Constitutionally material. Id. To 
satisfy the test for Constitutional materiality, the 
evidence must possess an exculpatory value that was 
apparent to police before the evidence was destroyed 
and be of such a nature that the defendant would be 
unable to obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonable means. California v. Trombetta, 467 
U.S. 479, 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 
(1984). The mere "possibility" that evidence could 
have exculpated a defendant does not suffice to 
establish that its exculpatory value was "apparent" to 
police. Parker, 72 F.3d at 1451. The availability of 
a witness, such as Ms. Griffin's sister, who could 
testify about the content of the destroyed evidence 
presents other reasonable means by which the 
defendant could have acquired comparable evidence. 
Id. at 1452. [FN1] In the absence of apparent 
exculpatory value, a party must show bad faith in 
the government's destruction of evidence. Id. at 
1451. Mere negligence does not establish bad faith 
in this context. Id. 
FN1. In Parker, a highway patrol officer 
accidentally erased a portion of a video taped car 
stop. This court found no error in the district 
court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. 
United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1452 (10th 
Cir.1995). 
The trial court examined the tape and heard the 
testimony of Sharron Griffin and Detective Riniker. 
Mr. Washington has provided nothing to establish 
the district court committed clear error in 
determining the government did not destroy 
potentially exculpatory evidence in bad faith and in 
denying the motions for sanctions and dismissal. 
B. 
Defendant next argues the independence of the 
grand jury was corrupted by the presentation of 
"false evidence." We review de novo the district 
court's denial of a motion to dismiss a grand jury 
indictment. United States v. Cowan, 116 F.3d 1360, 
1361 (10th Cir. 1997). 
*3 Mr. Washington made a pretrial motion to 
dismiss the indictment upon grounds of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct, including the prosecutor's 
knowing presentation of false testimony to the grand 
jury. The district court denied the motion. 
This court has explained that consideration of 
dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial 
misconduct before a grand jury requires weighing 
several factors: 
First, a reviewing court must determine whether 
the claimed errors should be characterized as 
technical or procedural and affecting only the 
probable cause charging decision by the grand 
jury, or whether the alleged errors should be 
characterized as threatening the defendant's right 
to fundamental fairness in the criminal process. If 
the errors can be characterized as procedural 
violations affecting only the probable cause 
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charging decision by the grand jury, then the 
defendant must have successfully challenged the 
indictment before the petit jury rendered a guilty 
verdict. If, however, the errors can be charged as 
threatening the defendant's rights to fundamental 
fairness as "going beyond the question of whether 
the grand jury had sufficient evidence upon which 
to return an indictment," a determination of guilt 
by a petit jury will not moot the issue. 
Second, it must be determined whether the 
prosecutor engaged in flagrant or egregious 
misconduct which significantly infringed on the 
grand jury's abilit) to exercise independent 
judgment. Thus even assuming misconduct, a 
failure by the defendant to show a significant 
infringement on the ability of the grand jury to 
exercise its independent judgment will result in the 
denial of a motion to dismiss. 
United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1466 
(10th Cir.1987) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
Applying the first factor, we must ask if the alleged 
governmental misconduct is merely "technical." 
"Technical" errors are of a procedural nature and do 
not involve claims of fundamental fairness. United 
States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1339-40 (10th 
Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 
U.S. 66, 71-72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 
(1986)). By contrast, Mr. Washington's challenge to 
the grand jury indictment asserts the prosecutor 
elicited perjured testimony or at least led the witness 
to make false implications regarding the evidence. 
Id. Because Mi Washington's claims fall in the 
category of right to fundamental fairness, they are 
not mooted by the petit jury's determination of guilt. 
Second, under the Kilpatrick test, we hold the 
prosecutor's behavior did not rise to the level of 
"flagrant or egregious misconduct which 
significantly infringed on the grand jury's ability to 
exercise independent judgment." On the tape 
recording submitted into evidence, Mr. Washington 
does not deny ownership of the cocaine. He also 
does not admit ownership. Mr. Washington's 
argument here is that the question and answer 
sequence asserts or implies the false statement that 
he did admit ownership. Mr. Washington argues that 
because the police officer stated he had listened to 
the tape, he must have known there was no such 
statement. Therefore, the officer's testimony 
a m o u n i s to perjury, and the prosecutor's failure to 
correct the incorrect implication amounts to the 
presentation of false evidence to the grand jury. At 
the very least, Mr. Washington argues, "if evidence 
exists ... which casts serious doubt on the credibility 
of testimony which the jurors are asked to rely upon 
in finding an indictment, the prosecutor has an 
ethical duty to bring it to their attention." 
Nonetheless, we do not think that the testimony is so 
misleading it merits dismissal of the indictment. 
*4 Indeed, we have allowed an indictment to stand 
even in cases of perjured testimony before a grand 
jury if independent evidence exists to support the 
charges on the assumption the grand jury would 
have returned the indictment without the perjurious 
testimony. United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523, 530 
(10th Cir.1983). Even though a defendant's 
admission of guilt might have significant impact on 
the jury in this case, there was a great deal of other 
evidence of Mr. Washington's participation in the 
charged activity. We think the prosecutor's behavior 
did not significantly infringe on the grand jury's 
ability to exercise independent judgment, and the 
district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss 
the indictment. 
C 
Mr Washington next challenges the search warrant 
for .2253 S. Belmont. As a general matter, we 
review de novo the district court's determination of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Kennedy, 131 F 3d 1371, 1375 
(10th Cir.1997). Several issues are raised in 
connection with the warrant. 
rhe first question is whether defendant had standing 
to attack the warrant. We review standing de novo. 
United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1499 (10th 
Cir.1996). At trial, Mr. Washington contended 2253 
S. Belmont was not his home, but the government 
argued it was. On appeal, the parties reverse their 
positions. 
When a warrant to search 2253 S. Belmont was 
issued, Mr. Washington had deeded away his title to 
his mother and his girlfriend two months before. 
When arrested on August 15, 1996, Mr. Washington 
gave 133 West May, # 504 as his address. Mr. 
Washington had resided at 2253 S. Belmont with his 
girlfriend for at least several months and made the 
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mortgage payments. The district court found these 
facts supported Mr. Washington's reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the residence he shared 
with his girlfriend. See United States v. Donnes, 
947 F.2d 1430 (10th Cir.1990). We agree. 
Defendant next challenges the evidence presented to 
the issuing magistrate. We review "the 
reasonableness of a warrant to determine whether 
the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for 
finding probable cause, giving great deference to the 
issuing magistrate's decision." Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 
1375. Mr. Washington argues statements made by 
the affiant in support of the warrant were false or 
misleading; therefore, they cannot properly serve as 
the basis for the warrant. We do not reach this issue 
because Mr. Washington did not raise it at trial. The 
failure to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge at 
trial waives the issue on appeal. United States v. 
Hart, 729 F.2d 662, 665 (10th Cir.1984). If a party 
raises the same general category of issues presented 
at trial, but adds a new or changed theory, we do 
not consider the new or changed theory on appeal. 
See Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher 
Steel of Kansas, 100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th 
Cir.1996). Vague references to a point made before 
the district court do not preserve the issue for 
appeal. Tele-Communications, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th 
Cir.1997). 
*5 Although Mr. Washington challenged the search 
warrant on several grounds at trial, none of these 
included his present contention the underlying 
affidavit contained false statements which were the 
basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause. 
It is a new theory not considered by the district court 
in determining whether the supporting affidavit 
provided a substantial basis for probable cause. 
Therefore, we shall not consider this new theory on 
appeal. 
D. 
Defendant next challenges the scope of the seizures. 
We review the district court's determination of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de 
novo. Kennedy, 131 F.3d at 1375. 
Armed with a warrant, DEA officers searched 2253 
S. Belmont. Items seized pursuant to the warrant 
included marijuana, paraphernalia, currency, 
documentation and scales. The officers also seized 
certain items not listed including a washer, dryer, 
television, lawn mowers, three-wheel vehicle, two 
video cameras and two tripods. Detective Riniker of 
the Wichita Police Department was unable to 
ascertain when and by whom these items had been 
purchased but seized them at the direction of the 
DEA officers. At an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court determined the items were properly seized 
under the civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 
881(a)(6), (b)(1), because they were discovered 
incident to the execution of a valid search warrant 
and because the officers had a good faith belief the 
items represented proceeds of criminal activity. 
Only evidence improperly seized outside the scope 
of a search warrant, and not all evidence, must be 
suppressed unless there was a flagrant disregard for 
the terms of the warrant. United States v. 
$149,442.43 in U.S. Currency, 965 F.2d 868, 875 
(10th Cir.1992). Like U.S. Currency, officers here 
seized items that had been named in the warrant and 
were indicative of drug trafficking involvement, in 
addition to the extra items not named in the warrant. 
At the time, however, Detective Riniker had 
information Mr. Washington had purchased cars and 
a house while unemployed and had been found to 
have large sums of cash on his person. 
In light of the officer's information and the items 
named in the warrant and seized at the house, the 
district court found the officers had a good faith 
belief the unnamed items represented proceeds of 
criminal activity. Although a lawn mower, washer, 
and dryer arguably are not obvious evidence of drug 
activity, items such as jewelry and tractors were 
seized under similar circumstances in U.S. 
Currency. In denying Mr. Washington's motion to 
suppress, the district court ruled correctly. 
E. 
Defendant next asserts the government failed to 
comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and the discovery 
order. Discovery rulings of the trial court are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. GWN Petroleum 
Corp. v. OK-TEX Oil & Gas, Inc., 998 F.2d 853, 
858 (10th Cir.1993). We review allegations of 
Brady [FN2] violations de novo. United States v. 
Woodlee, 136 F.3d 1399, 1411 (10th Cir.1998). 
FN2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 
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*6 Before Mr. Washington's August 26, 1996 
detention hearing, the prosecution provided Mr. 
Washington with a copy of his audio taped 
conversation with Ms. Griffin. On the same day, the 
government filed its motion for detention which 
included attachments such as a draft transcript of the 
tape recording, Mr. Washington's prior record, 
copies of police reports of prior arrests, paperwork 
seized from Mr. Washington and various 
automobiles, the fingerprint report, and several 
witness statements. 
On January 24, 1997, Mr. Washington's counsel 
made several motions for sanctions on alleged 
government suppression of the original audio tape 
and testimony regarding the destroyed portion of the 
tape. He also asked for dismissal or an order setting 
a deadline for government compliance with the 
discovery order. By the time of the hearing on these 
motions, the government had delivered, or promised 
to deliver the next day, most of the requested 
discovery. The district court ordered the government 
to turn over the list of Ms. Griffin's drug sources 
and any Brady material. The court also noted the 
government could not provide a record of the 
statements deleted from the audio tape because none 
existed. The trial court did not rule specifically on 
the original version of the audio taped conversation, 
although the prosecution notes that on October 24, 
1996, defense counsel heard and recorded the 
original tape. The government complied with the 
January 31, 1997 discovery order by turning ovei 
materials before trial. 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2) confers upon a trial coii.it 
broad discretion in imposing sanctions on a party 
failing to comply with discovery orders. United 
States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1060 (10th 
Cir.1988). Mr. Washington has made no showing 
that the prosecution failed to comply with discovery 
orders or that any unnecessary delay resulted from 
the time frame in which defense counsel received 
discovery materials. Mr. Washington provides no 
support for the claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its treatment of the discovery issues 
before it. 
Following a hearing on Mr. Washington's pretrial 
motion to compel disclosure of certain evidence 
under Brady, the district court ordered the 
government to disclose to the defense any evidence 
it had regarding Ms. Griffin's cocaine sources. 
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After an in camera hearing, the district court 
decided not to compel the government to disclose the 
identity of a confidential informant who had 
purchased drugs at the home of Ms. Griffin. Before 
trial, the government provided Mr. Washington with 
a list of sources named by Ms. Griffin in 
questioning. During cross-examination, however, 
Ms. Griffin named two cocaine suppliers whose 
names did not appear on the list provided to Mr. 
Washington before trial. 
A defendant establishes a Brady violation by 
demonstrating: (1) the prosecution suppressed 
evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the 
accused; and (3) the evidence was material. 
Woodlee, 136 F.Sd at 1411 We have explained, 
"Brady mandates reversal when a failure to disclose 
is coupled with a finding that the evidence is 
'material/' meaning "there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.' " United States v. Scarborough, 128 
F.3d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (citing United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 
3375, 87L.Ed.2d481 (1985)) 
*7 Mr. Washington sought information on I\ Is. 
Griffin's drug suppliers to support his theory that 
Ms. Griffin had obtained the crack cocaine found in 
the safe from a supplier other than Mr. Washington, 
and he had not been the owner of the seized cocaine. 
Mr. Washington argues Ms. Griffin was an admitted 
cocaine dealer who supported her children with the 
proceeds of her dealing. According to Mr. 
Washington, the cocaine in the safe was left either 
by Ms. Griffin's husband (before he began serving 
jail time) or supplied by another dealer. A complete 
list of suppliers and access to the confidential 
informant who "might help disclose the identities" of 
suppliers would assist Mr. Washington in 
demonstrating he was not the owner of the safe and 
its contents. 
Although Mr. Washington's theory may be rational, 
it does not satisfy this court's standards for 
establishing a Brady violation. First, Mr. 
Washington lias not shown, the prosecution 
suppressed evidence. The government complied with 
the district court's orders to turn over its list of 
suppliers before trial. See Scarborough, 128 F.2d at 
1376 ("Brady is not violated when the Brady 
material is made available to defendants during 
Orig, 1.1. S Gnvi. Works 
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trial."). The government turned over the material it 
had; there is no support for the implication that the 
government suppressed advance notice of the names 
of the additional sources identified by Ms. Griffin at 
trial. 
Second, the additional names and information 
appear to have only marginal "favorable" value to 
Mr. Washington. As the district court 
acknowledged, Mr. Washington was "entitled to 
attempt to establish that he was not the owner of the 
crack cocaine and that Griffin obtained the crack 
cocaine from some other supplier." However, the 
fact Ms. Griffin had two or four drug suppliers is 
equally unhelpful to Mr. Washington in the absence 
of any evidence one of them owned the safe and its 
contents. Third, Mr. Washington has not 
demonstrated the new evidence was material. The 
jury heard the names and still did not find in Mr. 
Washington's favor. Defense counsel heard the 
names but did not introduce evidence about these 
additional suppliers [FN3] or claim that he would 
have if provided with the names at an earlier date. 
There is no reasonable probability that disclosure of 
the two names or of the identity of the confidential 
informant would have produced a verdict in Mr. 
Washington's favor. 
FN3. Ms. Griffin revealed the names in cross-
examination on Thursday. The government rested 
Monday. If the weekend would not have provided 
defense counsel with sufficient time to obtain 
evidence about the additional drug suppliers, it 
certainly would have been enough time to prepare a 
motion for a continuance to investigate the 
information. United States, v. Kelly, 14 F.3d 
1169, 1176-77 (7th Cir.1994); see also United 
States v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1394, 1404 (10th 
Cir. 1990) (stating the defendant should have moved 
for a continuance if he needed more time to 
investigate evidence that failed the Brady 
materiality test). 
F. 
Mr. Washington specifically challenges the 
prosecutor's statements about the criminal 
convictions of his friends, his firearms possession, 
and his domestic violence arrest. We review for 
abuse of discretion the district court's denial of a 
defendant's motion for a new trial based on claims 
of improper statements by the prosecutor. United 
States v. Oles, 994 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10th 
Cir. 1993). 
*8 At trial, defense counsel attempted to impeach 
Ms. Griffin by cross- examining Officer Walker 
about the fact that Johnny Dean, who was found in 
Ms. Griffin's home on the night of her arrest, had a 
felony conviction. In his objection, the prosecutor 
stated if the court was going to permit impeachment 
by evidence that a witness had friends with 
convictions, the prosecution would employ the same 
tactic by impeaching Mr. Washington with the "long 
list" of his friends' convictions. The court sustained 
the prosecutor's objection. At the end of testimony, 
the court instructed the jury the statements of 
counsel were not evidence. 
In redirect examination of the same police officer, 
the prosecutor posed the leading question, "you 
know that Sharron Griffin is not the only one in this 
courtroom who possessed a firearm," while 
gesturing toward Mr. Washington. Defense counsel 
objected. The prosecutor then stated that he would 
put on a witness who would testify to Mr. 
Washington's firearm possession. When the 
prosecutor did call witnesses to testify on this 
matter, the district court sustained objections of 
defense counsel. The court instructed the jury to 
disregard the legal arguments and objections of 
counsel. 
On direct examination, Officer Garrison stated that 
Mr. Washington had been arrested for domestic 
violence. The district court instructed the jury to 
disregard that statement. 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor referred to 
electronic scales seized from 2253 S. Belmont. 
Although a pretrial order notes such scales were 
found, evidence was never offered at trial. The 
government states that after defense counsel objected 
to questioning of a police officer present when the 
scales were seized, the government "changed its 
evidence presentation and simply overlooked the 
scales." 
A criminal conviction "is not to be lightly 
overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments 
standing alone." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 
1, 10, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). 
Improper prosecutorial statements must be viewed in 
the context of the strength of the evidence; whether 
curative instructions were given; and, whether the 
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prosecution was responding to an attack made by 
defense counsel. See Oles, 994 F.2d at 1524. 
Applying the Oles test, there is strong evidence 
against Mr. Washington, including his palm print on 
the safe, items seized under the search warrant, the 
audio tape recording, and various witness testimony. 
The district court gave curative instructions on the 
statements about Mr. Washington's friends with 
convictions, firearms possession, and domestic 
violence arrest. Moreover, defense counsel opened 
the door for the prosecutor's statements on the 
criminal convictions of Mr. Washington's friends. 
Although the prosecutor's statement about the scales 
became improper because this evidence was not 
admitted, United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 
599 (10th Cir.1984), it is very unlikely this 
statement alone impaired the jury's ability to judge 
the evidence fairly. Young, 470 U.S. at 12. In light 
of these factors mitigating the influence of the 
prosecutor's conduct on the jury, Mr. Washington 
has failed to show the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. 
*9 Mr. Washington next argues the district coin t 
erred by failing to exclude evidence of prior 
convictions, cash possession, and a "drug dealer 
profile/ The district court denied his motion in 
limine to exclude any evidence of his possession of 
large amounts of cash. Subsequent testimony 
established seizures of over $40,000 from him. Mr. 
Washington's prior conviction of possession of 
cocaine was admitted as Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) proof 
of knowledge and intent. Although he objects to the 
government's use of drug dealer profile evidence, he 
cites no testimony in the record relating to such a 
profile. [FN4] We review for abuse of discretion the 
district court's admission or exclusion of evidence, 
Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th 
Cir.1995); United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 
1073 (10th Cir.1994), including Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) 
evidence. United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d H"71 
1488 (10th Cir. 1996). 
FN4. Counsel has failed to comply with 10th Cir 
R. 28.2(b). 
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid, 403, To be unfairly 
prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403, evidence must 
not be merely damaging to a party's case, but must 
also have an "undue tendency to suggest decision on 
an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one." United States v. 
Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted). 
In the context of drug distribution cases, large sums 
of cash are sufficiently probative to warrant 
admission under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Id. at 1085. This 
is a drug distribution case where the district court 
ruled the probative value of the large sums of cash 
was not outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Mi Washington's arguments on unfair 
prejudice are not convincing because, as we have 
already noted, there is a wealth of "other evidence" 
of his participation. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be 
admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) if it complies 
with certain strict standards. United States v. 
Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Because Mr. Washington denied knowledge of or 
intent to distribute the crack, and asserted the palm 
print on the safe must have reflected accidental 
touching, evidence of his past possession had 
probative worth in establishing intent, knowledge, 
and absence of mistake or accident. Mr. Washington 
tries to distinguish the previous offense on grounds it 
involved only 30 grams of cocaine, whereas the 
instant charge is for over 400 grams, and it occurred 
over six years before the most present offense. 
These arguments do not establish an abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's finding that the 
offenses were sufficiently similar and close in time 
to the current matter. Mr Washington has not 
shown the relevance and probative value of this 
evidence were substantially outweighed by the 
potential for unfair prejudice. 
*10 Several courts have condemned the use of 
profiles as substantive evidence of guilt. United 
States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1521 (10th 
Cir. 1991). Because we have not been shown where 
such evidence was used in this case, this argument is 
specious. 
H. 
At trial, Mr. Washington objected to the submission 
of an aiding and abetting instruction. He argues Ms. 
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Griffin's possession with intent to distribute the 
crack cocaine was distinct from any charges 
involving him. We review de novo the sufficiency of 
jury instructions in a criminal case. United States v. 
Barrera-Gonzalez, 952 F.2d 1269, 1271 (10th 
Cir.1992). We review de novo whether the jury 
should have been given a matter to decide. United 
States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1491 (10th 
Cir.1991). 
Despite Mr. Washington's argument, we have 
already held, "a defendant can be convicted as an 
aider and abettor even though he was indicted as a 
principal for commission of the underlying offense 
and not as an aider and abettor, providing that the 
commission of the underlying offense is also 
proven." United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 
706 (10th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). When the 
jury is instructed on both theories, we affirm the 
convictions if the government has sufficiently proved 
either the substantive offense or the aiding and 
abetting offense. Id. Mr. Washington's distinction 
between cocaine stored in the bedroom versus in the 
safe does not immunize him from conviction for 
aiding and abetting. 
I. 
At the conference on jury instructions, Mr. 
Washington objected that the proposed instructions 
defining "possession with intent to distribute" and 
"aiding and abetting" failed to properly define the 
element of "intent." We conduct a de novo review to 
determine whether, as a whole, jury instructions 
correctly stated the governing law and provided the 
jury with an ample understanding of the issues and 
applicable standards. United States v. Winchell, 129 
F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir.1997). When we review 
a claim of error in jury instructions, "we consider 
all the jury heard and, from [the] standpoint of the 
jury decide not whether the charge was faultless in 
every particular but whether the jury was misled in 
any way and whether it had an understanding of the 
issues and its duty to determine these issues." United 
States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1529 (10th Cir.1996). 
"No particular form of words is essential if the 
instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement 
of the applicable law." Considine v. Newspaper 
Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1365 (10th Cir.1994) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Mr. Washington argues that the first element of the 
instruction given on possession with intent to 
distribute failed to define accurately the element of 
intent. He also proposes the aiding and abetting 
instruction could have been improved if the third 
element of that instruction were "replaced with 'that 
the defendant acted with the intention of causing the 
crime to be committed.' " 
*11 We believe the instructions as a whole properly 
inform the jury of the factors it had to find to 
convict. Even without the words preferred by Mr. 
Washington, the instructions on both counts 
provided the jury with "an intelligent, meaningful 
understanding of the applicable issues and 
standards." Winchell, 129 F.3d at 1096 (quotation 
and citation omitted). Because we lack "substantial 
doubt that the jury was fairly guided," we cannot 
reverse. Id. 
J. 
Appellant next questions the sentence he received. 
We review the district court's interpretation of 
sentencing statutes and guidelines de novo, United 
States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th 
Cir.1997), and the district court's factual findings in 
support of sentence enhancement for clear error. 
United States v. Valdez-Arieta, 127 F.3d 1267, 
1270 (10th Cir.1997). We will "not reverse the 
district court's findings unless they are without 
factual support in the record or unless after 
reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Id. at 1270 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
The government provided Mr. Washington with 
notice that it planned to introduce into evidence his 
1990 conviction for cocaine possession, as well as 
his domestic violence arrest. Mr. Washington 
objected at sentencing to the addition of criminal 
history points for two previous disorderly conduct 
convictions. The district court overruled his 
objections. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the 
district court determined a total offense level of 34 
and a criminal history category of III, resulting in a 
sentence of 240 months. This sentence is consistent 
with the statutory minimum penalty of twenty years 
for possessing more than 50 grams of crack cocaine 
after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. 21 
U.S.C.A. § 841(b). 
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When the Sentencing Guidelines conflict with 
statutes, the statutory law prevails. United States v. 
Allen, 16 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1994). Further, 
"where a statutorily required minimum sentence is 
greater than the maximum of the applicable 
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum 
sentence shall be the guideline sentence/ U.S.S.G. 
§ 5G 1.1(b). Twenty years or 240 months is the 
statutory minimum sentence for an offense involving 
more than 50 grams of crack cocaine following a 
previous felony conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(l)(A)(iii). Because the statutory minimum 
applies in this case, any error in the calculation of 
the guideline sentence is irrelevant. 
K. 
In support of a post-trial motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence, Mr. 
Washington offered the affidavit of Johnnie Dean 
who, according to the affidavit, would testify that he 
had observed Ms. Griffin open the safe, remove 
cocaine, and sell it to another individual. In pretrial 
interviews by the prosecution and the defense, this 
"new" witness had not disclosed any information 
about the safe or its contents. The district court 
dismissed the motion for a new trial. We review the 
district court's decision for abuse of discretion. 
United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1531 (10th 
Cir.1997); United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 
819, 827 (10th Cir.1997). 
•12 Trial courts may grant a new trial Hif required 
in the interest of justice/ Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. 
However, this court has explained that "a motion for 
a new trial is not regarded with favor and should 
only be granted with great caution." Sinclair, 109 
F.3d at 1531. A new trial may be granted only 
under delineated circumstances. United States v. 
Stevens, 978 F.2d 565, 570 (10th Cir.1992). 
It is not entirely clear why Mr. Dean did not reveal 
his knowledge about Ms. Griffin's sale of cocaine 
from the safe when he was interviewed by the 
prosecution and defense. Mr. Washington states that 
Mr. Dean had feared that he, too, would be charged 
if he talked about drug purchases, but he finally 
came forward to prevent Mr. Washington from 
going to jail for a crime he did not commit. The 
government's view is that Mr. Dean "lied" to the 
investigators. The sentencing trial record shows Mr. 
Dean said he did not share this information with 
investigators because they did not ask him about it. 
In any case, circumstances cast doubt on whether 
the evidence was discovered after trial or whether a 
lack of due diligence caused the defendant's failure 
to discover it in time for trial. 
Mr. Washington argues the new evidence does not 
merely impeach the credibility of Ms. Griffin, but 
also supports the defense theory that Ms. Griffin 
was the owner and dealer of the cocaine. Therefore, 
he believes the new evidence is material to the 
principal issue in the case-the ownership of the safe 
and cocaine-and that with this evidence, a jury 
would probably acquit in a new trial. Further, if the 
defense had been able to use this evidence in the 
original trial, Mr. Washington claims the district 
court would have looked more favorably on his 
request for access to the confidential informant. 
Although his conjectures may be plausible, we 
cannot say the district court abused its discretion in 
finding otherwise. 
We AFFIRM the district court on all of the issues 
raised on appeal. Mr. Washington has not shown 
that the cumulative effect of governmental 
misconduct deprived him of a fair trial or due 
process of law, or that the district court erred in 
denying any of his motions on evidentiary and 
discovery issues. The instructions to the jury 
provided a sufficient statement of the law and 
standards. Further, Mr. Washington's "new" post-
trial evidence did not offer grounds for a new trial. 
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